ISI2011 Abstracts

Goal constructs are a crucial theoretical element in social cognition and social cognitive development. In this talk, we will examine the typology of goals proposed by interactivism and discuss the process of goal directed behavior. With respect to social cognition, we will use the interactivist goal construct to help clarify some of the problematic and potentially conflated uses of implicitness, automaticity, and unconscious goal pursuit. Regarding social cognitive development, the interactivist goal construct will be used to clarify how young children and infants can understand other entities as being goal-directed without assuming that they are attributing mental states to these entities.

An Organizational Account of Function with a Focus on Functional Differentiation

1Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Avenida de Tolosa 70, 20080, San Sebastian, Spain
2Department of Product and Systems Design Engineering, - University of the Aegean, Syros, Greece

*Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: argyris.arnellos@ehu.es (A. Arnellos), alvaro.moreno@ehu.es (A. Moreno).

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we distinguish between etiological and organizational perspectives on function, analyzing two distinct theories related to each perspective: Wright’s selectionist etiological approach and Godfrey-Smith’s modern history theory of functions, in the case of the etiological perspective; and Cummins’ functional analysis and Bickhard’s interactivist approach to function, among organizational accounts. While explaining these two accounts of function, we also deal with the relationship between this concept and other important biological concepts, such as adaptation, selection and autonomy. By arguing that changes in functionality are always grounded on changes in systems’ organization, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that functions are supposed to obey. Furthermore, it satisfies other well-known desiderata of function, such as those of non-epiphenomenality and of accidental ascription. At the end, we discuss and provide a detailed analysis of the notion of organizational differentiation, as a crucially important aspect for an organizational account of function.

Romantic Compromises: To give up the possible, to live with the present

Compromises involve yearning for the not pursued possible and settling for an inferior option. The dissonance between the possible and the actual, and the dissonance between the better and the inferior are at the basis of compromises. To compromise is to give up the pursuit of a better prospect, which is in principle feasible, in order not to risk an actual situation, which is perceived to be inferior. Compromises involve the active participation of both imagination and intellectual activities.
Compromises are of great value in many circumstances that arise in our human environment; compromises can help us to avoid disputes and fights and enable us to live peacefully with each other. However, compromises also have a negative aspect in that they might require us to surrender our principles. These two contrasting views of compromise are based upon the two opposing aspects implicit in compromise: the necessity to be sensitive to the other’s needs and the willingness to relinquish something of value.
The issue of compromise becomes even more complex when we are dealing with romantic love, the idealized characterization of which seems to refuse any type of compromise. However, since romantic love involves an intimate and intense relationship between two people, compromises are required in many romantic circumstances.
Compromises involve relinquishing a yearning for the not-pursued possible and settling for an inferior option. The dissonance between the possible and the actual, and the dissonance between the better and the inferior are at the basis of compromises. To compromise is to give up the pursuit of a better prospect, which is in principle feasible, in order not to risk an existing—or to settle for a current—situation, which is perceived to be inferior. The chosen situation is better than the worst possible situation, but it is inferior to the possible, better, although risky option.
The following circumstances are likely to give rise to the need for compromise:
• A person perceives an alternative situation as better than her current one;
• The better situation is in principle feasible;
• The person gives up the attempt to obtain this situation—fearing from a worse situation.
Compromise is not characterized in absolute terms of "good" and "bad" but in relative terms of "better" and "worse." The focus of concern in compromise is not upon the person's actual bad situation but upon a possible better alternative which the person decides not to pursue because of its possible cost. Giving up the better alternative is not related to intrinsically bad characteristics of this alternative, but to external circumstances which may be quite costly. One can get used to the fact that her partner is not the best possible lover and friend. As it is hard to significantly change the partner’s personality, there is no choice but accepting the partner’s characteristics. However, if the main concern is that of giving up the pursuit of an apparently better (and feasible) alternative, getting used to it is much harder. In giving up the valuable alternative the agent does not give up its value for her. In this sense, the agent keeps alive this alternative. Maintaining this alternative in her mind prevents the agent from being content with her present situation. It is a kind of incomplete experience, a painful unfinished business.
Compromise entails accepting something negative in exchange for the prospect of gaining or maintaining something positive. There are two major aspects in compromise: (a) the settlement of differences by consent reached by mutual concessions; and (b) a concession to something evil. The first aspect entails sensitivity to the other’s needs; in this sense, compromises enable people to live together peacefully. The negative aspect of compromise involves the possibility that one might have to relinquish some of one’s principles, values, or merely one’s likes, preferences, or habits. The second aspect can entail the loss of something of considerable value. Unlike politics, which is often characterized as the “art of compromise,” in ethics, compromise is usually regarded as s sign of weakness or lack of integrity (Benjamin, 1990; Biddle, 1957; Goldin, 1979; Margalit, 2010; Van Willigenburg, 2000).
The need to compromise is even more pronounced in our flexible modern society, which is populated with so many alternatives from which to choose. When there are hardly any alternative to the present situation, there is no need to compromise or to ponder our optimal way of behaving. The issue of compromise becomes more critical when there are many tempting alternatives.
Morality is highly complex and sensitive to contextual and personal subtleties. The very fact that morality recognizes the presence of an order of priority between our values indicates that morality accepts violation of less important values when this is necessary. Considering minor breaches as morally acceptable recognizes the value of compromises (Day, 1991). Contrary to the popular saying, “Once a cheater, always a cheater,” human beings are able to moderate their activities while not necessarily slipping down the slippery slope. In contrast to the zero-tolerance approach, a Scottish proverb says: “Better bend than break.” Bending, which is a kind of compromise, is the flexibility that enables the ideal to be maintained for a long time. People who refuse to compromise their ideals often abandon them.

References
Benjamin, M. (1990). Splitting the difference: Compromise and integrity in ethics and politics. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
Ben-Ze’ev, A. (2011).“The Nature and Morality of Romantic Compromises,” in C. Bagnoli (Ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press,.
Biddle, F. (1957). Necessity of compromise. In R. M. MacIver (Ed.), Integrity and compromise: Problems of public and private conscience. New York: Harper (1-8)
Day, T. J. (1991) Moral dilemmas, compromise and compensation. Philosophy, 66, 369-375.
Goldin, M. P. (1979). The nature of compromise: A preliminary inquiry. In J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman (Eds.), Compromise in ethics, law and politics. New York: New York University Press (3-25).
Margalit, A. (2010). On compromise and rotten compromises. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Prins, K. S., Buunk, B. P. & VanYperen, N. W. (1993). Equity, normative disapproval and extramarital relationships. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 10, 39-53.
Van Willigenburg, T. (2000). Moral compromises, moral integrity and the indeterminacy of value ranking, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 3, 385-404.

From Parmenides to Persons

Mark Bickhard
Lehigh University
Presents an overview of the Interactivist framework, beginning with the Pre-Socratics and ending with a model of the social ontology of persons.

Ethics and Meta-Ethics from an Interactivist Perspective

Mark Bickhard
Lehigh University
Discussions of ethics make presuppositions concerning underlying ontologies of agents and actions, and these presuppositions are often false and misleading. I will outline some metaethical issues that arguably need revision and explore some of those revisions and their consequences.

Interactivism and Central Nervous System Dynamics

Mark Bickhard
Lehigh University
The central nervous system has evolved via the exploitation of the enabling potentialities of microgenesis, and has generated the emergence of basic consciousness, learning, emotions, and reflective consciousness. I will outline the macroevolutionary course by which this has occurred.

Iatrogenics in the Philosophy of Mind

Mark Bickhard
Lehigh University
I argue that many, perhaps most, of the seemingly intractable problems that beset the philosophy of mind are in fact products of the background assumptions involved in framing the problems. If so, then they are truly "hard" — impossible in fact — without changing those background assumptions.

MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE HUMAN CONTROL SYSTEM

Stanislas Bigirimana
Department of Philosophy
Ruprecht-Karls-University
Schulgasse 6
69117 Heidelberg
Germany

Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology are based on Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism distinguishes physical objects and mental processes. For Descartes, there are two types of substances i.e. material substance (res extensa) which is defined by extension in space, and thinking substance (res cogitans) which lacks this extension. However, the origin of this dualism remains unclear given the unwillingness to take into account history and context in the construction of contemporary philosophical discourses. This unwillingness leads to universalistic and a-historical discourses that aim at rational reconstructions and an assumed argumentative continuity between ancient discourses and their contemporary counterparts. However, given the rise of Cartesian thought in early modern times, one can consider Cartesian metaphysical dualism as the vestige of the medieval metaphysical opposition of the supernatural to the natural which culminates with a distinction of two substances in the human person, mainly the body and the soul. From this point of view, the project of naturalizing the mind would amount to what Raymond and Barresi called “the naturalisation of the soul.” This dualism has many ramifications in philosophy. It had generated fruitful philosophical debates based on crucial philosophical distinctions such as substance vs. form, knowledge vs. opinion, actuality vs. potency, substance vs. accidents, essence vs. existence, faith vs. reason, reality vs. appearance, eternity vs. time, and the soul vs. the body. This dualistic pattern still prevails in contemporary philosophical debates where distinctions such as rationalism vs. empiricism, idealism vs. positivism, principles vs. facts, ideas (concepts) vs. objects, theory vs. practice, regularly occur.

From another point of view, Cartesian dualism is linked directly with naturalism, mechanical theories of the universe, and the success of the physical sciences in a way that it can be interpreted as the consequence of a reduction of an Aristotelian four levels description of reality to two levels as a way of conforming reality to the mechanical model. Cooney denounces Descartes reduction of a four levels model of the universe two levels as a way of making it fitting within the mechanical framework. This occurred because Descartes’ rejection of scholasticism implies his rejection of a four levels Aristotelian descriptive scheme to two levels for the only purpose of fitting it to the mechanical model. As Cooney has pointed out:
Most people then (as now) thought of our planet as populated by four categories of beings:

The cumulative nature of this tetrad resides in the fact that: “Each higher level, from the first to the fourth, includes the lower with the addition of a further attribute” Descartes reductionism resides actually in reducing the second and third levels of the tetrad to the first on the ground that “plants and animals were to be understood merely as machines, complex systems of movable parts that enable them to behave adaptively in their environment.” Therefore,
His (Descartes) reduction of life and sentience to the motion of material particles created an abyss between the human mind and body. It has the effect of suspending our consciousness in a world of bodies with which it has nothing in common. Each human mind became a ghost in its own machine.

By assuming a metaphysical difference between physical objects and mental processes Cartesian dualism implies a top-down approach to the mind that lead to difficult philosophical problems such as the problem of mental causation. This approach locates mental processes in individual minds assumingly located in individual human bodies, what leads to epistemological solipsism. This top-down approach portrays the mind as an ethereal reality that eludes direct observation and scientific experiment.

However, there is a possibility of reaching an understanding of the structuring and the functioning of the mind Cartesian dualism. This implies rejecting not only Cartesian dualism as a philosophical position but also the mechanical model of the universe which influenced it. A cybernetic model, for instance, instead of reducing natural processes to matter and motion, as mechanics does, adds order and purpose as part and parcel of natural processes and systems. In other words, when dealing with natural processes and systems using a cybernetic model, we are not dealing with “dead” matter, ever static and immutable. Even the concept of motion itself is not restricted to change in spatial location. It can portray as originally used by Aristotle any change including not only material objects and particles in motion i.e. changing spatial location, but also, different patterns and processes of organisation that confer to natural and material complex systems and processes a certain level of order or negative entropy or amount of information. Matter understood this way, implies that we are not looking only at fundamental particles in motion or immutable mechanical laws but at the various ways through which material elements are set in motion (mechanical aspects) but also the various ways material elements organise themselves into structures and processes that are capable of fulfilling natural or artificial purposes. In addition to looking at matter from the point of its nature (substance), a cybernetic model is open for a possibility of adding structure, behaviour and function (purpose) as significant aspects of reality. Reality therefore, is not reduced to its mechanical aspects but as material elements organise themselves into structures, systems and processes with a certain degree of order i.e. negative entropy or amount of information, become both significant (yield some meaning) and useful (have some value) in a way that they can serve various purposes pertaining to the intelligent life we associate with the mind.

The notion of information itself embodies patterns of being, behaving and becoming because on the one hand, information can be defined in terms of patterns of (self-) organizing matter and energy. Wiener’s definition of information as “negative entropy” gives pertinence to the idea of information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy. This idea of information is linked with the fact that information appears in terms of spatial arrangements be they arrangements of molecules and their parts (eg. DNA) at the macro-molecular level, arrangements of nerve cells and impulse patterns in the vertebrate nervous system, spatial arrangements of objects in the environment, spatial arrangement of signs in mediated reality such as language (social form of language), or spatial arrangements of signs in meta-forms (personal forms of language or highly formalized languages such as rules of logical inference, mathematical operations and computer algorithms that apply only to restricted domains). These spatial arrangements lead to various forms of consciousness. At the macromolecular level the totality of molecules, their parts and their connections, leads to the interaction of molecules and their parts on the basis of electrochemical signals. However, it is the totality of impulse patterns as an indivisible quality that control behaviour. These impulse patterns themselves are based on the spatial arrangement of nerve cells and impulse patterns in the brain. It is at this level that the control role of the brain is played and some contemporary philosophers of mind do not hesitate to locate mental activity at this level. However, it is the third level of organization of material objects in the environment that leads to a consciousness of objects in the environment as the totality of these objects in situation are seen as indivisible qualities leading to meaningful reaction to impulse patterns and their cause in the environment. It is at this level that most normative epistemologists locate the point of departure of epistemology as a discipline by separating processes that occur at the macromolecular and in the nervous systems (especially in the brain) i.e. “internal processes,” from processes that depend on spatial arrangements of objects in the environment i.e. “external processes.” In standard normative epistemology “internal processes” are considered as subjective i.e. occurring within the knower while “external processes” are considered as objective i.e. constituting the reality or the object to be known.

Going back to the macromolecular level in assessing information as patterns of (self-) organizing matter and energy, bridges the gap between the subject and the object because instead of a top-down approach to assumes that mental processes are non-material processes that occurs within non-material processors, there is a possibility of reversing the trends and suggesting a bottom-up approach that not only takes into account our genetic heritage as a species but also the physiological processes that the homo sapiens share with other members of the animal kingdom. This bottom-up approach extends the boundaries of epistemology as a discipline because instead of focusing on the process of human knowing in the normal human adult, this approach looks at different time-frameworks that includes how the genetic and physiological processes that sustained the process of human knowing were established through selection and adaptation, on the one hand, and how the patterns of spatial arrangements of material objects in the environment influence physiological processes that lead to different patterns of behaviour at the levels of psychomotor activities. This bottom-up activities challenges arbitrary boundaries within the animal kingdom such as those established between humans and animals and those that separate rational and instinctive patterns of behaviour. Moreover, this approach can provide a solution to the problem of other minds because it does not suggests starting the apprehension of knowing processes from an individual isolated mind as it is done in the Cartesian tradition, but, by acknowledging that different patterns of spatial arrangements constitute the material, mechanical or physiological basis (hardware) of the process of human knowing and that these spatial arrangements are not restricted to the physical constitution of the knower (i.e. the body, that can quickly be opposed to the mind). There is a continuum between spatial arrangements at the macromolecular level and at the level of the nervous system but the impulses at these levels do not activates themselves. They set into activity as “[t]he totality of objects in situations” is considered as “indivisible qualities.” In other words, the consciousness of the environment arises when objects in situations are processed as an indivisible qualities leading to meaningful reaction to impulse patterns and their cause in the environment.

Furthermore, the level of consciousness of objects in the environment still corresponds to normative epistemology’s realm of inquiry that restricting knowing to invariant relationships between invariant characteristics of material objects (essences or universals) and invariant non-physical processes “in” the human mind leading to universal and objective knowledge that can easily be formulated into univocal propositions of the form S is P. However, this restriction of the domain of inquiry of epistemology is not only tributary to the attempts of modelling philosophy in general and epistemology in particular to the physical sciences, with the search for immutable universal laws that can be formulated into simple mathematical relations, but it also misses the fact that spatial arrangements of material objects are not established once for all. Therefore, changes of the spatial arrangements of material objects in the environment may lead to changes in the patterns of impulses at the macromolecular level or at the level of the nervous system and subsequently to change of behaviour. Moreover, changes in the spatial location of the organism that embodies the macromolecular and neurophysiological processes at hand may equally lead to changes of the patterns of impulses and connections in a way that changes behaviour. What normative epistemology misses by reducing the relation between the subject and the object to an invariant representation process that is objective and universal is “[t]he principle of no immediate instructive interaction.” According to this principle, as stated by Fuchs-Kittowski: “[i]t is insufficient to view the generation and use of information only in terms of reception of available information from the outside world in order to obtain a direct representation.” In fact:
In studying the essence of information in living systems it becomes apparent that here information is not simply transmitted in one-sided, directed processes. Instead, the exchange takes place in a meaningful context allowing an evaluation and a creation a new.

Therefore, the spatial arrangements that constitute the basis for conceiving information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy are not limited to the spatial arrangements of material objects in the environment. Reducing reality to material objects leads to mechanistic materialism that defines reality in terms of matter and motion and seeks immutable universal laws for an invariable relation of representation of the object by the subject. However, dynamic and integrative epistemology acknowledges the material and natural aspect of objects but also their cultural value and symbolic significance. The symbolic significance of objects is at the origin of human culture and communication since humans can use these objects as intermediaries (media) for their own interaction. This ability leads to the fourth level of consciousness, which is, according to Fuchs-Kittowski, the conscious of society that is achieved through the spatial arrangements of signs in language (social form of language) with the totality of established forms of language leading to communication of meaning in social interaction. That is why dynamic and integrative epistemology does not define the human person by isolating minimal or essential qualities such as reason, freedom and will that are believed to constitute an immutable core, or by separating “mental” from “physical” processes. It recognizes that human physiological processes are an essential part of an integrated but differentiated pattern and this pattern makes human living possible by maintaining the human internal environment within certain limits though metabolism and homeostasis but also by interacting with the human immediate and mediated environment. Human living is then essentially linked with the human person natural relatedness. At individual level, the human person integrates various physiological processes that constitute a substratum for emotional and intellectual processes. As a related being, the human person is characterized by ethical and behavioral processes that are integrated with the emotional and the intellectual ones in a way that the individual is capable of relating to his or her human and non-human environment through the use of natural and cultural resources. Natural and cultural resources are part of an information and communicative process because as vehicles of meaning and value, they are intermediaries i.e. media that allow human persons to live purposeful and meaningful lives.

This unity of purpose and meaning is embedded in the French word sens. Therefore, human living makes sense through one’s partaking in a human history that goes beyond one’s limited life time. Through signs and symbols that at the origin of purposeful and meaningful communicative processes, the human person transcends one’s temporal and spatial boundaries and reaches out to other persons on the one hand, and on the other creates techniques and technologies that allow the person to dig into the abyss of history and collective memory and at the same time to face challenges and seize opportunities of the present and to make plans for the future. Many of our contemporaries are not aware that usual practices such as preparing budgets, making timetables, booking appointments with other people are expressions of this self-transcendence because they are ways of handling the future while we are still in the present. The same applies to practices such as keeping records and archives that are ways of handling the past while our lives move forwards in the future. This explains the double sense of the French world sens which means both meaning and purpose. Our lives then make sense because we can look both forwards and backwards without looking the grip on the present. This is an essential quality of humans that allows human persons to partake in both natural and cultural resources. It is through transcending one’s temporal and spatial boundaries that one reaches the fifth level of organization which is for Fuchs-Kittowski, the consciousness of Self and Values through the spatial arrangements of signs in meta-forms (personal form of language) where the totality of selected forms of language lead to the communication of meaning in personal interaction.

It is this consciousness of Self and Values that justify the dimension of human knowing as self-appropriation. Knowing as self-appropriation compels us to acknowledge that it is the knower and not the object of knowledge that is at the centre of the process of human knowing. The knower is not solely a rational being in the intellectual sense but a multidimensional unity with emotional, intellectual, ethical and behavioural capabilities. The knower integrates the physical dimension made of material, mechanical and electrochemical processes with logical and symbolic processes. While the former make the knower a natural being the latter make the knower a cultural being. As a cultural being, the knower is a creator of value and meaning because by enriching natural objects with value and meaning, the knower turns natural objects into artefacts. Therefore, any process of information generation through enriching data with value and meaning is an artificial or better an artful process. It is at this level of artistic creation that human natural processes such as material, mechanical, and electrochemical processes are given a cultural significance that goes beyond their material value and utility. That is why gestures such as greeting do not have any value in terms of material utility but yet they are very important for human interaction because of their symbolic significance. The same applies to other symbols of status or powers such as bank notes, academic certificates, and contracts which in terms of their natural constitution (hardware) are simple and almost valueless pieces of paper but in term of their symbolic significance (software) they acquire a high value and a lot of importance.

There is, therefore, an intrinsic link between the notion of information and the notion of control because by defining information as patterns of (self-)organizing matter and energy, one becomes aware of the role of control in maintaining living systems alive. That is why Wiener does not actually separate information and control is his description of a cybernetic model as a science of information and control in the animal and the machine. There are actually striking similarities between Fuchs-Kittowski’s “levels of information” and Beniger’s “levels of control.” Both Fuchs-Kittowski and Beniger locate the first level of information or/and control the macromolecular level (DNA) where for Beniger life is generated through genetically based sociality (many animal species) following an intermediate stage where replicating molecules generate diversity according to their level of success in reproducing exact copies. For Beniger, the first level of control corresponds to the stage of organic life. At all stages of control, Beniger distinguishes processors i.e. spatial arrangements and programming i.e. the presence of instructions or programs that guide subsequent behaviour. A program, according to Beniger, is “any prearranged information that guides subsequent behaviour.” This information at the macromolecular level of the DNA is genetically programmed. Control, on the other hand, is “purposive influence towards a predetermined goal.” By looking at levels of control (or levels of information in Fuchs-Kittowski’s vocabulary) in terms of processors and programming, Beniger points to the fact that at the macromolecular level, molecules are not just material entities but that by bearing genetically inherited programs they are geared for change and not any change but change that is pre-determined by the genetic heritage. In other words, spatial arrangements of macromolecules enable these macromolecules to effect control i.e. to fulfil predetermined goals. The dialectic of information and control therefore, implies that living organisms are oriented both past and future oriented. On the and, genetically inherited programs tend to maintain some physiological and behavioural patterns that individual organisms have inherited from their species but at the same time the ability to fulfil predetermined goals imply that these behavioural patterns can change as goals change and that actually in the long term even the physiological patterns can also change. Adaptation to changing goals therefore implies a possibility of change either at the structural (physiological) level or at the behavioural level. This potential for change therefore calls for models that not emphasized embodies of information is structures that can change not only in their structuring but in their functioning. This is what Fuchs-Kittowski calls a “no-substance-understanding.” A no-substance understanding implies that:
Information is not a non-physical substance, a ‘thing’ whose identity is independent of any physical body to which it may temporally be ‘attached’. Information must be understood as a specific effect and as a relationship.

Therefore, looking at information as a special effect and as a relationship implies giving up a top-down approach that postulates that reality is constituted at the highest abstract level by substances that are exemplified by individual kinds. These substances are often associated with similarities that members of a species share. These similarities are believed to be unchanging or the more unchanging they are, the more substantial they are considered to be. This is a vestige of some ancient philosophical approaches that associated reality with permanence and change with appearance. However, a bottom-up approach that defines information as (self)-organizing matter and energy upholds that information is not an epiphany of essences but the outcome of processes in the physical worlds where energy is not just a derivative of matter in motion but a constituent of reality as a guarantor of change, growth or decay. That is why at the first level of control that Beniger associates with organic life, the macromolecules are not passive material entities which would play of fundamental particles like those sought by physical chemistry but integrated entities and processes that embody their material constituents, the order in which these constituents determine the macromolecules structures and the ways through which these macromolecules fulfil predetermined goals by following genetically inherited programs. A similar pattern can be observed as the second level of control i.e. culture. At the cultural level control is effected through culture-based social structures which reinforce learned behavioural programs that are stored in the vertebrate brain. At this level Beniger and Fuchs-Kittowski still agree on the role that spatial arrangments of neurons and their impulse play in determining levels of information and/or control. However, Beniger does not make provision for the spatial of objects in the environment. For Fuchs-Kittowski, it is the spatial arrangements of objects in the environment that is at the origin of the consciousness of objects. The consciousness of objects in the environment is at the origin of the traditional epistemological problem of distinguishing objects from subjects. Beniger, by skipping this aspect, locates controls at the spatial arrangement of signs, in language for instance - the fourth level of information – without explaining how these signs have been formed in the first place. Beniger is right in stating that the vertebrate brain is the processor of learned behavioural programs that are themselves controlled by programming stored in memory. However, these learned behavioural patterns are not independent of genetically inherited programming which could have emerged on a long time scale from the direct interaction of former members of the species with spatially arranged objects in their environment. This interaction can explain the abilities in most animal societies of identifying useful and harmful substance, the development of means of locomotion and communication that allow the access to useful objects and the avoidance of the harmful ones, the organs and strategies of defence against harmful predators, the choice of habitats that are conducive to growth and reproduction, sedentarization or migration patterns that allows survival through remaining in useful habitats and leaving harmful habitats, the size of the populations in the same habitat, and the physical size and dexterity of individual kinds which allow either individual survival or survival in groups of different sizes. Beniger, therefore, locates culture from the point of view of the way it is assimilated by individuals unlike Fuchs-Kittowski that places communication of meaning in social interaction before the consciousness of Self and Values which lead to the communication of meaning in interpersonal interaction, creation of values.

In other words, Beniger locates culture at the level where individual members of species have self-appropriated learned behavioural programs unlike Fuchs-Kittowski who places self-appropriation at the highest level of information after the consciousness of society. This difference at which level of control and/or information culture occurs implies a difference of priority for Fuchs-Kittowski and Beniger. By omitting the consciousness of objects in the environment, Beniger takes for granted the fact that sociality is always (or already) mediated. However, Fuchs-Kittowski, upholds a principle of “no immediate instructive interaction” According to this principle: “[it] is insufficient to view the generation and use of information only in terms of a reception of available information from the outside world in order to get a representation.” This is so because, at the first level of control, the vertebrate brain as a processor is not a black box, through inherited genetic programs on the other hand, it is influence by the long terms history of the species to which it belongs because this history determines not only its physiological constitution but also its inborn behavioural patterns that every member of a species share with other members. At the second level of control the vertebrate brain on learned behavioural programs that are acquired for the case of humans through early education and experience and that are developed and adjusted through adult life. The influence of the long-term past of a species and the short-term past (experience) of individual on the constitution and the functioning of organs such as the vertebrate brain leads to a rejection of the definition of the human mind with categories that are borrowed from a metaphysical dualism that associate reality with permanence and change with appearance. Human minds change not only as processors (vertebrate brains) but also in their programming. The latter, in humans for instance, changes because of genetic inheritance, experience and education.

From this background the human mind as a control system that implies maintaining the human internal environment within thresholds on the one hand, and fostering the adaptation of the human organism to changes in the environment.
As Cooney has pointed out:
The activity of self-maintenance through interaction with an environment is a special and important case of a kind of function that is very common in systems engineered by humans. This general function is control, and I will call the function that distinguishes living systems adaptive control. The job of a control system is to maintain another system (its environment) within certain limits. This suggests that a threefold division of the system into (1) a sensor that is able to detect changes in the variable(s) to be controlled in the environment, (2) the modulator, which receives a signal from the sensor and selects a response to what is detected, and (3) the effector, which the modulator causes or signals to act on the environment in such a way as to bring it within, or closer to, the prescribed limits (the modulator’s setting). The result of the effector’s intervention in the environment constitutes a change that is, in turn, detected by the sensor. This phase of the control loop is called feedback.

An Interactivist Account of Moral Virtue and Vice

Is there a relation between autism and schizophrenia?

Address: Research Assistant @ Bilecik University, Philosophy Department, Bilecik/Turkey

Graduate Student @ Middle East Technical University, Philosophy Department, Ankara/Turkey

Abstract

The main question to be discussed in this essay is whether there is a relation between autism and schizophrenia or not. This relatedness between them grounds on the claim that both autism and schizophrenia are disorders of attribution of mental states. Metarepresentation ability which enables people to represent mental states gives rise both theory of mind competence and consciousness as well as both autistic and schizophrenic people have problems in their metarepresentation ability. Dysfunctioning of metarepresentation causes inabilities in pretend play, false belief, shared attention that are considered as parts or precursors of theory of mind mechanism. Therefore, it is supposed that autism involves an impairment of theory of mind competence and they do not understand other people’s mental states properly. The other premisses, which lead us to conclude that they are related disorders, is that schizophrenia includes a sort of deficit of access consciousness. Metarepresentation is needed for functioning access consciusness. However, schizophrenic people do not perform the task of metarepresentation as autistic people. As a result, problems with metarepresentation can explain both autism and schizophrenia in a similar way. It also implies that there might be a distorted access consciousness in autism or theory of mind mechanism in schizophrenia.
1. Autism and Theory of Mind
First of all, I am going to explain what autism is and the deficits of autism, then I will discuss autism, which is agreed as a deficit of theory of mind, and focus on what theory of mind is. World Health Organization describes autism as having following impairments: specific abnormalities of social behavior, communication impairments, which also affects non-verbal communication, lack of imagination and creativity, which can be seen in role-play and pretence (Boucher 1996, p. 224). Autism is an uncommon developmental disorder in which people do not understand that other people’s beliefs are different from their own beliefs. It is widely thought that they are not able to understand that other people have independent minds. They do not attend to the same thing, goal directedness of other’s actions or desires lead them to these actions (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 59). They cannot attribute mental states and predict behavior in accordance with it (Frith & Happe 2002, p. 2).
            Autism can be understood by placing it within a developmental context. Baron Cohen holds that autistic children have problems in their social and communication development in their first years of life, and they also lack their imagination and pretence ability (Baron- Cohen 1995, p. 60). The key symptoms of their social abnormalities are lack of eye contact, social awareness, and appropriate social behavior. They are not able to join a social group and make friends (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 63).
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) suggested that autistic children have theory of mind deficit. Theory of mind capacity is impaired in autism according to Baron- Cohen et al and I will focus on this proposal in my paper. Baron-Cohen suggests that if theory of mind capacity is acquired properly by normal children, they can understand that other people attend to the same thing, goal directedness of other’s actions or desires that lie under their actions whereas autistic children have problems in interpersonal communication and they do not contact socially with other people.
To understand what causes autism, I shall first describe what theory of mind is in a general perspective. Specifically, theory of mind means that understanding other people’s mental states. Namely, people attribute mental states to other people if they have a functioning theory of mind ability. Indeed, theory of mind provides us to understand other’s mental states. Premack and Woodruff postulated that a theory of mind is required to attribute beliefs, knowledge, ignorance and emotions to both oneself and others (Premack & Woodruff 1978, 519). Even if mental states are not observed directly, they are used to make predictions about behavior. Theory of mind is a mental competence which involves many parts which get together such as recognizing false belief, pretence etc. People have to realize some tasks in order to have theory of mind competence and performing these tasks leads people to have a functioning theory of mind mechanism.
Many people argue that theory of mind has a number of precursors (Baron-Cohen 1991, p. 239). These precursors of theory of mind emerge gradually and all of them are dependent to each other. Shared attention, pretence, gaze following are precursors of a larger system (theory of mind) and they come before a functioning system. If those are impaired, it seems that people do not have a normal theory of mind competence and examined as autistic. If one of the capacities does not function properly, it leads children to have many other deficits. They have many problems that vary with age. For example, autistic children have deficits in mentioned precursors such as pretence and shared attention, which lead us to claim that there is a failure of theory of mind ability. It demonstrates that theory of mind has some parts and precursors and those are functioning gradually. Hence, autism is caused by impairment in theory of mind because autistic children lack many other deficits, which are parts or precursors of theory of mind.
In order to be clearer in explaining what theory of mind is, I shall discuss the parts of theory mind and present the functioning of them. Performing false belief task is an ability to ascribe mental states and recognizing false belief is one of the parts that form this combination. False belief task is to attribute false beliefs and people are able to know that other people can have false beliefs. Performing this task could differentiate someone’s false belief and the subject’s true belief. Wimmer and Perner (1983) designed a false belief test to show that normal children can distinguish their true belief and other’s false belief. In addition to that, false belief test was carried out by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) so as to determine whether autistic chidren have ToM or not (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1993, p. 60). This test provided evidence that they have impairment in their understanding of false belief because in autism, there is an inability of understanding other people’s different beliefs (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1993, p. 61). Leslie, Frith and Baron-Cohen investigated false belief test to show autistic children cannot pass this false belief test (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 72). In the false belief test, Sally has a marble, which hides in a basket and then she goes away. Anne puts the marble into a box when Sally is gone. And then, Sally returns and wants her marble. Normal children can pass this false-belief test at around the age of three to four (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1993, p. 60). In that case, autistic children do not predict Sally’s behavior where the marble was. It shows us that they are unable to understand mental states and predict behaviors of others. Thus, they do not understand other people can have false beliefs and they do not pass false belief test (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 71). Likewise, in Smarties experiment, which was adapted by Leslie, Perner, Frith and Leekam results that most of the autistic children do not predict of belief correctly. Actually, normal children pass false belief test and true belief as well as other’s false belief could be distinguished by normal children (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 71).
Pretence is a component that is a precursor of the combined theory of mind mechanism. Baron-Cohen prepared “The Chat” in order to diagnose children as autistic or not and he asked their parents if they can produce pretend play. For example, “Does your child ever pretend, for example, to make a cup of tea using a toy cup and teapot, or pretend other things?” is a question which was asked to parents so as to determine whether child has pretence ability or not. In order to produce pretence, people must understand how pretending is different from not pretending and most of the autistic children do not produce pretend play (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1993, p. 64). Pretence ability emerges which allow children to mentalizing but both of them are impaired in autistic cases (U.Frith 2003, p. 170). They repeat the same activity and they do not produce imaginative play (Aarons 1992, p. 6). Thus, it implies that there is a missing component, which cannot be substitued and whole life is affected since it is a developmental disorder (U.Frith 2003, p. 15).
In addition to the deficit of pretence, shared attention is another missing precursor of theory of mind in autism. Shared attention is an ability of sharing and comparing experiences of others but autistic people also are deprived of shared attention capacity. As an illustration, there is a lack of shared attention between mothers and autistic children. It also supports that autistic children do not recognize other minds. They do not develop a capacity to represent the internal beliefs, feelings and thoughts of others. Eventually, it is a precursor of theory of mind and autistic people are poor at shared attention. So, this deficit leads them to many other deficits such as interpersonal communication, social contact problems (Zahavi 2005, p.132).
Having explained what autism is and theory of mind deficit that causes autism, I will explain an ability that forms the basis of other precursors and parts of theory of mind competence. Metarepresentation task is the basis of an overall functioning theory of mind and its impairment causes autistic cases. In general, metarepresentation is an idea that the interpretor represents a representation in someone’s head and it is about of aboutness relation. A metarepresentation describes an agent’s mental state (Frith & Happe 2002, p. 5). There is a sort of relation between agent and situation. Pylyshyn stated that metarepresentation is an ability to represent the representational relation itself (as cited in Baron Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1993, p. 112). Indeed, meta-representation simply means a representation of a representation, and theory of mind require a capacity of metarepresentation. For instance, a photograph of a painting of unicorn is a case of metarepresentation since it involves a representation (photo) of a representation (painting) of something (unicorn) (Baron Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1997, p. 114). Children need more than representation skill and they have to go beyond primary representations because pretence could not be produced by utilizing just primary representations. Leslie argued that metarepresentation refers to a sort of data structure computed by our cognitive system ( as cited in Baron Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen 1997, p. 87). Theory of mind provides mental representation capability. Metarepresentation is the underlying explanatory mechanism of theory of mind. Autistic children are impaired or delayed in their capacity to form or process of metarepresentation. Consequently, it impairs the capacity of theory of mind and an impaired capacity causes impaired development.
Theory of mind capacity is impaired in autism. It is explicit that all precursors of theory of mind are dependent on each other. For instance, metarepresentation is required for pretence, and without metarepresentation, they do not maintain pretence. Those developments are related to each other (U. Frith 1999, p. 170). Thence, pretence is one of the precursors of theory of mind that comes before a mature theory of mind competence. It is also one of the parts of theory of mind that functions with other components provide to have a theory of mind competence that enables people to ascribe mental states. It requires metarepresentation ability as an underlying mechanism of other parts and precursors of theory of mind. Theory of mind provides attributing mental states to others and interpreting, predicting behavior in terms of mental states (Zahavi 2005, p. 133). Theory of mind includes all of them as a central mechanism and theory of mind failure could be diagnosed as autism regarding of deficits of one of them. To sum up, theory of mind provides attributing mental states to others and interpreting, predicting behavior in terms of mental states (Zahavi 2005, p. 133).

2. Schizophrenia and Access Consciousness
Having now argued that autism involves theory of mind and metarepresentation deficits, I will discuss schizophrenia and its deficits so as to propose that autism and schizophrenia are related disorders. On the basis of my explanations of schizophrenia, I will also consider that schizophrenic people have problems in their access consciousness and I will try later to link schizophrenia and autism with respect to aspects of access consciousness deficits. I am seeking a possible answer to the question are autism and schizophrenia related disorders, thence metarepresentation impairment in autism and schizophrenia is an important issue that lie in the interpretation of the assumptions about autism and schizophrenia and their relatedness. As mentioned previously, autism involves impairment in theory of mind competence and metarepresentation ability is needed to have a functioning theory of mind. In order to demonstrate the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia, I will approach to the point by considering that schizophrenic involves problems with consciousness and consciousness also requires metarepresentation ability. For that reason, impairment with metarepresentation might explain autism and schizophrenia in a sense and the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia can be reached.
Schizophrenic people’s actions do not involve any intention, goal or feelings. Thought insertion and hallucination are positive symptoms of schizophrenia. They suffer from distortions of thinking, perception such as auditory hallucinations, or they describe colors or features of things seem to them different from other people (D. C. Frith 2003, p. 98). For instance, schizophrenic patients may also believe that they will get sunburn because other people are lying under sunray (D. C. Frith 2003, p.124). This is the delusion case in schizophrenic patients whose self-awareness of intention is impaired. Thought insertion is another symptom of schizophrenia in which people have access to their own mental states but they claim that they are controlled by others. It supports that their access consciousness may not be normal as other human beings. Since the aboutness-intentionality relation between self to external world or inside the self is disturbed.
Consciousness is a widely debated issue and there is not a common conception of what consciousness really is. I will focus on the phenomenal and access consciousness in order to explain what is missing in schizophrenic and autistic cases. For example, Van-Gulick focuses on what it is and conscious experiences of self and world in his article “Consciousness”. After 1960s information processing became important and internal mental processes was emphasized (Van Gulick 2004, p. 4). According to Searle, consciousness is a significant feature of human and animals. He says that when people are awake, they are in a state of consciousness (as cited in Manson 2003, p. 143). Being sentience is being able to sensing and responding to the stimuli according to Amstrong (as cited in Van Gulick 2004, p. 5). In that case, when people fall a sleep or in a coma state, it is not decisive that whether they are still conscious or not. On the other hand, Carruthers suggests that being conciousness means that being aware of being aware. Moreover, Nagel asserts that being a conscious organism is fulfilling the “what it is like” criteria. It is a subjective grasp of the world and having experiences in terms of how the external world appear to that organism (as cited in Van Gulick 2004, p. 5)
Consciousness is relational; it is being conscious of self to target relatedness. This relatedness might be among the self- external world- inner self. Moreover, Van Gulick argues that conscious states include meta-intentionality (Van Gulick 2004, p. 6). I have mentioned what metarepresentation capability is above and state consciousness involves mental states, which are about other mental states according to Van Gulick. He refers that phenomenal states are experience of the external world in terms of this consciousness conception (Van Gulick 2004, p. 7). Having a conscious state needs to have interaction with other states as well as access that one has to its content (Van Gulick 2004, p. 7). A state is access conscious when it provides direct access of thought and action. On the other hand, phenomenal consciousness is what it is like to be in a particular state as Nagel proposes. If we focus on the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, Ned Block thinks that even if they interact, the divergence among them exists. Ned Block considers differences between phenomenal and access consciousness. First of all, phenomenal consciousness has a phenomenal content whereas access consciousness has a representational content (Block 1995, p. 389). However, it could be argued that phenomenal content may also involve representational content in itself but access consciousness has a functional ground, which means a state’s consciousness depends on how its representational content functions (Block 1995, p. 383). Therefore, we could grip that sensations are phenomenal states but thought, beliefs; such sort of propositional attitudes that contain representational content are access conscious states (Block 1995, p. 384). He carries on this argument by discussing blindsight example. He suggested that there is also a failure in the access consciousness of blindsight patient. These people have damage in their visual cortex and they become blind in visual area. However, they may sustain to reach or grasp objects without having conscious visual states. Some of blindsighters do not possess a complete phenomenal consciousness because of the damage of visual cortex.
One of the common characteristics of conceptions of consciousness is intentionality, having a representational quality. Van Gulick holds that concious mental states have a representational content. It means that these mental states are about things. Block also argues that phenomenal conscious mental states have also representational content like access conscious states. In this sense, metarepresentation competence has to be considered again as a crucial component of consciousness because it provides an aboutness relation between mental states. It is not tenable to suggest that there is a normal consciousness in an organism without capacity of metarepresentation.
What’s more, I will emphasize the higher order theories of consciousness because higher order theories of consciousness hold that a higher order mental state is about another mental state and it is conscious when mental state is directed toward another mental state (Carruthers 2007, p. 4). As an illustration to higher order mental states is that my desire to taste an apple would be a higher order desire and it requires performing metarepresentation ability. Hence, consciousness is accepted as relational and derived from the relation between mental states. According to Rosenthal, consciousness has a relational property and they are modeled on thoughts not perception (as cited in Cunningham 2000, p. 75). He focuses on the relation between a mental state and a higher order thought about that mental state (Rosenthal 2005, p. 23). Higher order theories of consciousness argue that a mental state’s being conscious involves being aware of being in that mental state (Cunningham 2000, p. 78). Therefore, it implies that performing metarepresentation task is needed to be aware of being in that mental state because the relation between higher order representations forms the basis of our conception of consciousness. From the perspective of Ned Block, it cannot be assumed that blindsighters do not have also a normal phenomenal consciousness since their phenomenal mental states do not have a complete phenomenal representational content. Moreover, Peter Carruthers develops his argument about consciousness by illuminating what higher order representations are and what they do in access consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness has a representational content for Carruthers. Conscious states are states, which the subject is aware of and they have a higher order representational content either a higher order perception or belief or thought (Carruthers 2007, p. 4).
After two conceptions of consciousness are elaborated, the main issue could be interpretation of these assumptions on the basis of schizophrenia and autism. I am seeking a possible answer to the question of whether theory of mind impairments may imply consciousness impairments, thence theory of mind and consciousness connection is agreed, what kind of consciousness impairments that schizophrenic and autistic people have is sought to be answered. Therefore, I shall claim that access consciousness impairment leads people to have schizophrenic or autistic symptoms. Since it is not possible to say that they could have normal access consciousness as other humans do. Even if phenomenal consciousness bases on having phenomenal content and it is an attempt of having phenomenal mental states by sensation of the external world, they have to still comprise representational content. For instance, blindsighters have an unconscious visual process. Those are people, who have a disturbed phenomenal consciousness. It could be assumed that they have a normal access consciousness but phenomenal consciousness also has representational capacity and they are not able to perform the metarepresentation ability. Simply, their access consciousness may not be as normal as other people’s access consciousness. Their situation remind me that the case of schizophrenic people.
Schizophrenic involves problems with access consciousness and access consciousness requires metarepresentation ability as it is mentioned above. Lack of metarepresentation ability also leads us to think that they may have problems in their phenomenal consciousness because, phenomenal consciousness also have representational content in itself. If they are unable to complete metarepresentation task properly, a deficit in phenomenal consciousness might also be expected. Having now argued that phenomenal consciousness and access conscioussness interact with each other and there is a metarepresentation deficit in schizophrenia case, then we should also expect that schizophrenia might be a disorder of consciousness either access consciousness or phenomenal consciousness in the sense of lack of metarepresentation ability. Metarepresentation ability affects phenomenal and access consciousness, and if you follow Ned Block’s argument that concerns phenomenal consciousness states contains representational content, it derives us to think that schizophrenia may be accounted as a disorder of access consciousness.
My main question of the thesis is seeking the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia. Therefore, at first I mentioned that autism involves problems with theory of mind and theory of mind competence requires metarepresentation ability. It seems that problems in both autistic and schizophrenic cases with metarepresentation explain the relatedness of these disorders. Now, I will approach to the question in a different perspective and discuss in what aspects autistic people can interpret their own minds. It can be proposed that theory of mind is needed to understand mental states of others but it is also necessary for understanding their own mental states (Zahavi 2005, p. 132). When we have a phenomenally conscious state such as perception of green, a higher order thought is entertained by the phenomenally conscious person. Similary, in theory of mind, people need to have higher order thoughts to understand mental states of others and they need to have metarepresentation ability to have higher order thoughts. Their consciousness differs from other normal human beings because of the impaired metarepresentation ability. They do not have disturbed phenomenal consciousness as blindsighters have, since there is not any damage in their visual cortex or they do not have a problem of sensation of the external world. On the contrary, they are not aware of that other people have different mental states. It conveys us to the argument that they may have a kind of disturbed access consciousness since they do not understand that other people have independent minds. This does not entail that they could understand the mental states of themselves because we have discovered that they do not have a normal theory of mind mechanism. They do not know the relation between mental states appropriately. In this respect, it is possible to say that autism and schizophrenia include a kind of deficit of access consciousness.
On the other hand, the general explanation about schizophrenia provides us an outlook but the significant deficits in schizophrenia should be considered in order to support the claim that autism and schizophrenia are related disorders and the impaired abilities are similar to each other in both cases. For instance, in schizophrenia, it is believed that they have normal consciousness but it depends on what you understand from the term “consciousness”. Hallucinations or delusions are symptoms of schizophrenia in which they have different access to their mental states other than other human beings do. They experience hallucinations and delusions, they are sometimes more normal or they are socially isolate themselves (C. Frith 1996, p. 622). Consciousness involves metarepresentation ability, which means having representation of a representation that I mentioned above. People have to reflect on their desires, beliefs, and intentions. That is second order representation and human self-control is acquired by this ability. Schizophrenic patients do not describe their inner experiences because they have metarepresentation competence disturbance. It seems that a disorder of consciousness causes the symptoms of schizophrenia.
In schizophrenia, there is a target problem. It is plausible that they can register this aboutness relation whereas they cannot interpret it appropriately. They misattribute a source to an external source. For instance, they claim, “That thought is not mine”. They are aware of aboutness of their thoughts whereas they do not check its relatedness. Accordingly, they do not have a normal consciousness as other human beings have. Even if they capture this representational relation between external world, inner self and other people, they do not use their metarepresentational ability properly, because they do not behave in accordance with the representational context. They are aware of the mental state of others or external world but they do not check the relatedness between those mental states. Moreover, there is not much evidence about them and in what aspects they interpret other minds. Indeed, another problem arises after the acceptance of disturbed access consciousnes in schizophrenia. Since they do not use their metarepresentation ability, accordingly, they may not also interpret other’s mental states as normal as other humans do. Because it requires having a theory of mind competence and metarepresentation is one of the crucial steps that has to be satisfied in acquiring this capacity. All in all, they may not understand that other people have independent minds and the mental states of them.
Furthermore, theory of mind is an ability to attribute mental states to others and it is a competence that is required for social interaction (Burns 2006, p. 79). After we decide on that theory of mind forms the basis of social cognition, I shall mention anatomical and functional neural basis that lie under theory of mind and social cognition as Brune identifies in order to show the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia. Moreover, Burns has also suggested that schizophrenia is a disorder of functional and structural connectivity of social brain networks. Lack of social skills and social isolation are some of the symptoms of schizophrenia. It may be a dysfunctioning of physiological and function of neural networks. Brüne who is a psychiatrist holds that theory of mind impairment is found in many neuropsychiatric disorders including schizophrenia. He highlights that people cannot infer their own and other person’s mental states in schizophrenia. We can see theory of mind impairment in many schizophrenic symptoms such as delusion of alien control or presence of thought. It is caused by incapability of representing one’s own and other person’s mental states (Brüne 2005, p. 6). Brüne also refers to many studies deals with theory of mind impairment in autism and schizophrenia. Findings obtained from clinical studies suggest that schizophrenic people are impaired in social interaction. Theory of mind research in schizophrenia has to be investigated in detail to state the similarity between autism and schizophrenia.
Besides, Russell and Sharma state that “abnormalities in social cognition are an important aspect of the cognitive profile seen in many psychiatric disorders” and they say that theory of mind competence is a crucial component of social cognition (Russell & Sharma 2003, p. 271). In addition, Bayle raises that schizophrenic people are unable to monitor their own actions and also represent other person’s mental states. According to him, the incapability of mental representation of a person’s own action involves his capacity of attribution of mental states of other people (as cited in Brüne 2005, p. 6). Theory of mind impairment in schizophrenia causes a social dysfunctioning. Brüne says that this impaired social interaction assigns a deficit in attribution of mental states (Brüne 2005, p. 13). Deficit in social skills in schizophrenia is related to impaired understanding of other people’s mental states. However, I would not prefer to deal with theory of mind impairment in schizophrenia in order to support that schizophrenia and autism are related disorders, because there is not so much study that was held in that topic. I should retain this argument as a prediction rather than an empirical support of the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia because of the lack of the empirical findings. There is no room to argue that autism and schizophrenia are related disorders by looking at a small number of studies seeking the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia on that issue. If the studies on that topic sustained, the findings may support my hypothesis and we may be more close to support the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia.
3.Conclusion
In short, autism involves an impairment of theory of mind competence while schizophrenia includes a kind of deficit of access consciousness. These are premisses, which lead us to the conclusion that autism and schizophrenia are related disorders since, both autistic and schizophrenic people do not perform the task of metarepresentation. Metarepresentation ability is needed for functioning of both theory of mind and access consciousness as well as metarepresentation ability is impaired in both autistic and schizophrenic cases. As a result, problems with metarepresentation could explain both autism and schizophrenia in a similar way. It may also allow us to think that there is a distorted access consciousness in autism and a failure of theory of mind in schizophrenia because there is not much evidence about the level of understanding mental states of others in schizophenia or understanding their own mental states about the world or themselves in autism. If both access consciousness and theory of mind requires functioning metarepresentation ability and there is an impairment of metarepresentation in both autistic and schizophrenic cases; therefore, we can come up with the relatedness of autism and schizophrenia.

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Quantum Nature of Human Consciousness

Margarita Videnova-Lett
Sofia University, Sofia, Bulgaria
pointofintegrity@yahoo.com

During the twentieth century, the essential approaches for correlating mind with matter are philosophical and psychological, associated later with behavioral science, cognitive science and neuroscience. Quantum physics, since its very beginning, has become involved and has played the most active role in this discussion.
        Human consciousness has been a subject of investigation by different philosophers. The main stream thinks that consciousness is correlated to the behavior of the material brain. Philosophical and neurophysiological characteristics of consciousness have been used as guidelines for distinguishing different approaches to consciousness. Most of these approaches try to explore the nature of the conscious phenomenon from the standpoint of Quantum Theory.
        In this term, there are two categories of approaches. The first category includes approaches which apply the current version of Quantum Theory in investigating consciousness while the second category involves approaches which give thoughtful attention to some future upgrades of Quantum Theory. Representatives of the first category who have devoted their thoughts, hearts and knowledge to explore the quantum nature of consciousness are von Neumann, Wigner, Ricciardi, Umezawa, Vittiello, Beck, Eccless and Stapp (Atmanspacher, 2004).
        In the 1930s, John von Neumann, a Hungarian mathematician, begins describing neurophysiological and neuropsychological conscious processes using Quantum Theory. The investigation continues in the 1960s in works of Ricciardi and Umezawa who explore the correlation between mental memory states and the vacuum states of quantum fields. Other contemporary scientists involved in this discussion are Beck and Eccless who in the 1990s present a project about quantum mechanics’ application to excytosis at the synaptic effect.
        In the 1980s, Henry Pierce Stapp begins developing his own approach to the concepts of consciousness. In an attempt to answer the critical objections, he suggests a new interpretation of the theory, not necessarily global changes. His new interpretation of Quantum Theory includes significant constituent parts. However, Stapp’s concept is developed on the von Neumann’s viewpoint of projection postulate which is not an established inevitable substance of Quantum Theory (Atmanspacher, 2004).
        In his famous analytical interpretation of Quantum Theory, von Neumann presents the projection postulate as a mathematical instrument for measurement. He calls his work The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and publishes it in 1932. Von Neumann describes the projection postulate as “a discontinuous, non-causal, instantaneous and irreversible act” which is being performed when a quantum state transforms into an eigenstate (Atmanspacher, 2004). (An eigenstate means a visible state). This process is called collapse or reduction of the wave function.
        To explain the event of collapse of wave function, the double-slit experiment can be implied. During the test, a photon in isolation has three choices, to pass through the first slit, through the second slit or through both slits simultaneously. There is no possibility for a photon to land in two different regions at the same time. At the moment when one of the possibilities actualizes, the others cease to exist. This phenomenon is known as collapse or reduction of wave function. Wave function represents the development of all the possibilities that would occur between the region of preparation and the region of measurement, or during the time when a photon is in isolation. It is called wave function because it really looks like a constantly changing wave.
        The wave function has been discovered by Erwin Schrodinger, but von Neumann made a great contribution to its evolvement. The Schrodinger wave equation describes the development in isolation and a wave function as its mathematical representation in quantum theory. Von Neumann’s projection postulate as “a discontinuous, non-causal, instantaneous and irreversible act” opposes the Erwin Schrodinger equation which establishes a “continuous, unitary (reversible) evolution of a system” (Atmanspacher, 2004). Wave function, as a fundamental mathematical element of Quantum Theory, allows physicists to find out all the possible interactions of an observed system with a measuring device. For the above stated reason, the development in isolation of an observed system is considered, by most scientists, a central point of Quantum Theory (Zukav, 1980).
    Danah Zohar, a Harvard graduate with a degree in philosophy
and physics and the author of The Quantum Self: Human Nature and Consciousness Defined by New Physics explains that quantum theory does not directly associate the observation or the observer with creation of reality. However, the relation which is being born between the observer and the quantum wave function during the observation
gives concrete form to, one of the many possible realities inherent within that wave function. But there is already the potential for some very definite sort of reality there…. Furthermore, once the wave function has collapsed, its reality is as objective as anything else science studies. (p. 48)
        Also, Henry Stapp argues, as cited by Atmanspacher (2004), that “[C]onscious mental events are assumed to correspond to quantum collapses of superposition states at the level of macroscopic brain activity” (p. 9).
Another quantum approach to consciousness is offered by Umezawa and Ricciardi in the 1960s. They propose to apply the adherent structure of Quantum Field Theory for describing memory as a brain state. The main point of this approach is “to conceive of memory states in terms of states of many-particle systems, as in equivalent representations of vacuum states of quantum fields” (Atmanspacher, 2004, p. 10). Umezawa considers the activation of a neuronal assembly to be of a significant importance for conscious access to memory. He suggests that brain’s neuronal assemblies are the level where the direct correlation between mental activity and material environment occurs. The activation of neuronal assemblies, caused by external stimuli, leads to excited states with a definite limit of existence. Umezawa believes that vacuum, or ground states are caused by correlation between consistent neural assemblies and memory states. In result, the activation of neural assemblies allows a conscious recollection of the essential meaning encoded in the ground states.
        In the 1990s, Vitiello expands the ideas of this approach by including effects of dissipation, chaos and quantum noise. He accepts Umezawa’s statement that the interaction between a system and environment causes entanglement. According to Vitiello, dissipation is a result of interaction between a system and its environment. Allowing temporary limited memory rather than unlimited memory, dissipation is the main reason for the finite lifetimes of vacuum states. In Vitiello’s words, “consciousness seems thus to emerge as a manifestation of the dissipative dynamics of the brain” (Atmanspacher, 2004, p. 11).
        Some investigators believe that Umezawa and Vitiello’s approach to consciousness is convincingly acceptable for the use of Quantum Field Theory which allows avoidance of the restrictions of standard Quantum Theory. Explicitly in opposition to their opinion, many others insist that this approach is unsatisfactory with regard to a concrete empirical structure. Some scientists think that Umezawa and Vitiello’s approach does not distinguish mental and material states and their properties, resulting in an assumption of reducibility of mental activity to brain activity. Lack of clarification as to whether Quantum Field Theory is applied to the material or mental state and which one of these states is the primary object of investigation brings confusion, as well.
        While Stapp, Neumann, Wigner and some otheir adherents consider applying the existing version of Quantum Theory mainly with a different interpretation, representatives of the second category suggest a future expansion or generalization of Quantum Theory. Among the members of the second group are Penrose, Hameroff, Bohr, Pauli and Bohm. Approaches offered by Bohr, Pauli and Bohm consider generalization of Quantum Theory. This notion is based on their understanding of a relation between mental and material domains, viewed as a dual aspect of one reality. Also, David Bohm believes, as cited by Zohar (1990), that “the mental and the material are two sides of one overall process that are… separated only in thought and not in actuality. Rather, there is one energy that is the basis of all reality” (p. 58). Scientists express the idea of applying established concepts of Quantum Theory, such as complementarity and entanglement, to both mental and material spheres of consciousness.
Penrose and Hameroff are concerned with the lack of efficient current Theory of Quantum Gravity. “This new theory will not just be a slight modification of quantum mechanics but something as different from standard quantum mechanics as General Relativity is different from Newtonian gravity” (Penrose, 2000, p. 137). The new theory, in their opinion, will help understand the relation between an elementary conscious act and gravitational-induced reductions of quantum states.
According to Hameroff, the only place for these reductions to happen is the microtubules’ interiors with their specific isolated environment (Atmanspacher (2004).
        In his book The Large, the Small and the Human Mind(2000), Roger         Penrose questions the notion of the mental world emerging out from the physical realm. He offers speculations about the following subjects of discussion. What do feelings have in common with the physical reality? What correlation can exist between physical objects, such as energy, waves, particles and perceptions or emotions? How can these relations between physical and mental realms be explained? He states that regardless of the sense that these worlds are emerging from each other, there is no evidence for proof. Penrose indicates that if scientists would like to claim the existence of an ascendance of these worlds, they need to use mathematical constructions to support their ideas. Without mathematical concepts to indicate that the worlds emerge from each other, only the definite relations among these worlds can be declared. Penrose accepts the idea that all these different worlds are closely connected.
       The description of the physical world he correlates with the words “mathematical,” “calculational” and “predictive” while the description of the human mind, he associates with the words “emotion,” “aesthetics,” “creativity” and “inspiration”. Regarding consciousness’ description, Penrose states that consciousness belongs to the mental world and can be correlated with words such as “spirit,” “soul” or “religion” (p. 98). He suggests that we look for scientific explanation of consciousness, but honestly reveals that he does not know how to define “consciousness”. He only believes that “it is a physically accessible concept” (p. 98).
        In his attempt to describe consciousness, Penrose suggests that two main aspects to consciousness exist, passive and active. The passive consciousness can manifest through awareness, and it includes people’s perceptions and memory. The active consciousness involves the notions of free will. In addition to the passive and active aspects of consciousness, he presents a third aspect, in between these two, which correlates to understanding or insight. Also, Penrose connects the word “intelligence” which “understanding,” and “understanding” with “awareness” (p. 100). Therefore, he says, intelligence demands awareness. As one of the required features of consciousness, understanding, this human “ability to be aware of things” is a concept that has been developed through people’s evolution (p. 116). Understanding is not specific to mathematics and is not a computational thing. According to Penrose, “…non-computability should be a feature of all consciousness” (p. 117). For that reason, understanding should be an “instance” or a requirement of human consciousness.
        Regarding consciousness, the main stream of philosophers believes that the origin of consciousness is correlated to the functions of the material brain. Human brain, with its neural connections and operations, is a very complex system. Because of its material nature, human brain is an object of physical exploration. Mind, on the other hand, is an object of examination of quantum physics. Regarding the mind, all philosophers agree that it can relate only to the ideal world. Conscious interactions with the material world can happen only through mind’s ideas about reality. In addition, mind’s knowledge about the outside world can only be derived from an individual viewpoint; therefore, mind’s perception of the truthfulness of the real world can be built only on the basis of human subjective experience (Zukav, 1980).
        A big part of this subjective experience originates in our thought processes. It is David Bohm’s idea to search whether the analogy between quantum processes and human thinking experiences is coincidental. He finds out a vital connection between the quantum and thinking processes expressed through their unification. Bohm believes, as cited by Zohar (1990), that in Quantum Theory “remarkable point-by-point analogy between thought processes and quantum processes would suggest that a hypothesis relating these two may well turn out to be fruitful” (p. 76). He associates particles, being localizable, with our focused thoughts having ‘position’. Likewise, Bohm refers the wave momentum to our vague thoughts having ‘momentum’. Finding scientific explanation to thought processes is another important contribution of Quantum Theory to a better understanding the nature of conscious existence.
        Although there is no evidence that quantum events occurring in the brain, as everywhere in the material world, are effectively relevant to the brain activities, a large number scientists agrees that quantum events are, in some way, responsible for mental activity. Mental activity is correlated with the activity of so called neuronal assemblies (Atmanspacher, 2004). These neuronal assemblies consist of several thousands of coupled neurons which are the main building components of human brain.
       Neurons are one of the most sophisticated cells in the human organism. A neuron has an axon which divides into two branches, each of these branches finishing with a synapse. Axon is a kind of fiber consisting of many synapses. The interfaces through which the signals between neurons are transferred are called synapses. Neurons are connected to each other through these synapses. Neurotransmitters are the chemical substances responsible for transferring the signals. Synapses can transmit information electrically or chemically. Depending on the way of signal transmission, synapses can be electrical or chemical with chemical transmissions being slower than electrical transmissions (Penrose, 2000).
        There are two kinds of synapses, excitatory and inhibitory. While the neurotransmitters of the excitatory synapses can improve the firing of the next neuron, the neurotransmitters of the second kind can suppress the function of the neighboring neuron. Depending on reliability of synapses to transfer information, synapses’ strength can be determined. The neurotransmitters, through their function of transferring the signals between synapses, play an important role in defining the strength of the synapses. During a process called exocytosis, an arriving nerve impulse triggers the release of transmitters. This release frees the stream of information between neurons. In looking for a quantum theoretical aspect for describing brain activities, the exocytosis process is significant for being the most statistically substantial and theoretically detailed approach (Penrose, 2000).
        The neuron is a cell, and as every cell, it has a shape which is given by a structure called cytoskeleton. At its ends, the cytoskeleton has little tube-like arrangements, called microtubules, which together with actin and filaments, build up the cytoskeleton’s structure. The protein that these tube-like arrangements are made of is called tubilin. Microtubules are large molecules of joined-together small, one typed molecules to form a long chain. These polymers have an outside diameter of about 25 nm and are structured of thirteen lengthwise, non-transparent arrangements. Usually, microtubules play a role in cell division, but because the neurons do not divide, neuron’s microtubules are involved in transporting neurotransmitters within the cell. In this way, microtubules, also, determine the strength of synapses (Penrose, 2000).
       When neurons operate more actively, by producing higher firing rates, a neural connection with the mental state is being activated. The transfer function of an individual neuron is monotonic when increasing input leads to increasing output. As a result, neuronal assemblies are not stable. If the intermediate input leads to maximal output, then the transitional function is non-monotonic, and in this case, neuronal assemblies are stable. A firmly established equilibrium between inhibitory and excitatory connections among neurons is essential, so that a stable operation of an activated neuronal assembly can be achieved. After the
activation of neuronal assembly, its stable operation is required (Atmanspacher, 2004).
       In addition to being the cause of neuron growth and degeneration, microtubules play a role of cellular robots. Stuart Hameroff prescribes a big importance to this function of microtubules because “complicated signals could be sent along them” (Penrose, 2000, p. 131). Microtubules’ tube-like structure allows the processes occurring inside them to stay isolated from the outside activities. For such an extreme level of isolation, the existing water outside the microtubule walls might play a significant role. Hameroff thinks that “there must be quantum-superposed mass movement which are well isolated from the environment” (Penrose, p. 131). He proposes that quantum, logically consistent operations there might be occurring within the tubes. Also, water inside the microtubules probably is an important ingredient for these oscillating quantum processes happening there. The oscillating movements inside microtubules must stretch out over large regions of the human brain, and at a certain point, the quantum state and the environment might interact with each other.
        Stuart Hameroff suggests that the neuron’s interior is the place where consciousness correlates to quantum processes. Being made of neurofilaments and microtubule, structures that are of a significant necessity for transporting signals within cells, the neuron’s cytoskeleton is the lowest neurophysiological level at which consciousness might get entangled with matter. Tubulin establishments are considered to rely on quantum events.
       The team Penrose-Hameroff proposes that collapses of these tubulin states, caused by gravitation, can produce an elementary conscious act. Hameroff’s argument about microtubules playing a sufficient role for reductionism of quantum states must be trustworthy bearing in mind that he is Professor Emeritus, Departments of Anesthesiology and Psychology and Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona. Penrose’s team-partner advises that “The respective quantum states are assumed to be coherent superpositions of tubulin states, ultimately extending over many neurons. Their simultaneous gravitation-induced, collapse is interpreted as an individual elementary act of consciousness” (Atmanspacher, 2004, p. 14).
        The purpose of the important role of microtubules in the process of reductions of quantum states is supported by the suggestion that some special locations are required for this process. For quantum states to occur within the warm and wet environment of the brain, special locations are needed where the quantum states can survive long enough, so that the gravitational influence will reduce them (Atmanspacher, 2004). Microtubules provide this special environment; otherwise, the quantum states can become reduced by interactions with the thermal environment of the human brain. Quantum Theory is a call for help in order for these processes to be described statistically. In the quantum realm, the upper limit of quantum process is 10ֿ¹² sec., which is a lot shorter in comparison to the time limit of thermal cellular process. The difference allows the two processes to be differentiated; quantum processes being dominated over thermal processes (Atmanspacher, 2004).
        Penrose-Hameroff’s model is criticized by other scientists, among them Tegmark, who argues that quantum states cannot live long enough in the inhospitable environment of the brain to be reduced by gravitation. According to him, due to interactions in the brain, the logically inconsistent time scale of tubulin superpositions is less than 10ֿ¹². This lifetime is too short to be considered for a neurophysiological process to occur in the microtubuli, he says. The model of Penrose and Hameroff is criticized or rejected from a philosophical perspective, as well. Penrose and Hameroff’s speculative approach to consciousness is fascinating and ambitious but very provocative because of its conceptual problems and lack of reasonable, substantial and based-on-observation verification (Atmanspacher, 2004).
        After decades of neglect, philosophers from the last third of the twentieth century finally have decided to pay attention to consciousness. Wolfgang Pauli, a Nobel Prize-winner physicist, states, as cited by Zukav, “From an inner center the psyche seems to move outward, in the sense of an extraversion, into the physical world” (1980, p. 31). By creating a new model of human consciousness based on the concepts of quantum physics, scientists are able to emphasize the close relationship between human inner perceptions and the quantum processes occurring in everyday reality.
References
Atmanspacher, H. (2004, Nov. 30). Quantum Approaches to Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2006   Edition). Retrieved August 22, 2006, from URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/entroes/qt-consciousness/
Kuhlmann, M. (2006, June 22). Quantum Field Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2006 Edition). Retrieved August 22, 2006, from URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/cgibib/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=quantum-fie
Penrose, R., Shimony, A., Cartwright, N., Hawking, S. (2000). The Large, the small and the human mind. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Interactivism and the Extended Mind Thesis: Excising Vestigial Functionalism.

The Extended Mind Thesis has been variously characterized as a brand of externalism (Clark and Chalmers 1998); as an approach to situated cognition (Robbins and Aydede 2008); and as a consequence (perhaps even a trivial consequence) of functionalism (Sprevak 2009). As originally expounded by Clark and Chalmers, the thesis is all three of these things. Because they are mutually incompatible, the thesis is untenable.

Nonetheless, the thesis appeals to intuitions that are worth saving. A general theory of cognition should, I argue, take into account the dynamic couplings between an embodied subject and its environment, especially where such coupling is constitutive of cognition itself. It should allow for the different degrees and kinds of cognitive extension, of interpenetration between mind and world. Efforts that set out from functionalism are doomed, however. Efforts that set out from interactivism are not.

I attempt to articulate a defensible, non-trivial version of the extended mind thesis. Like the Clark and Chalmers thesis, this version may be understood under the rubric of situated cognition. But it is rejects externalism, and requires the rigorous purging of functionalism, and especially of the functionalist’s willingness to simply presuppose the functional normativity of cognition. Interactivist accounts of the emergence of such normativity (Bickhard 2002) allow for the successful reconstitution of a hypothesis of extended cognition.

Bickhard, Mark. 2002. Critical Principles: On the Negative Side of Rationality. In New Ideas in Psychology 20, 1-34.
Clark, Andy and David Chalmers. 1998. The Extended Mind. Analysis 63(1): 7-19.
Robbins, Philip and Murat Aydede. 2008. The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sprevak, Mark. 2009. Extended Cognition and Functionalism. T/he Journal of Philosophy 106(9): 503-527.

Evolution and the incorporation of knowledge

Andy Lock
School of Psychology
Massey University
Private Bag 11 222
Palmerston North
Email: a.j.lock@massey.ac.nz
Web: www.massey.ac.nz/~alock

Stephen Hill Ph.D.
Lecturer
School of Psychology
Massey University
Te Kunenga ki Purehuroa
Private Bag 11-222
Palmerston North
NEW ZEALAND
http://psychology.massey.ac.nz/staff/shill.htm

'Natural selection' is regarded as the primary cause of evolution in contemporary mainstream Darwinian theory. This conception of the role of natural selection is not without its critics1, and there is an alternative formulation that sees things differently. Reid (2007, p.8) puts the general position elegantly:

Self-sustaining integrity, an ability to reproduce biologically, and hence evolvability were inherent qualities of the first living organisms, and were prior to differential survival and reproduction.2
In this view, the creation of novelty is the prime mover of evolution, and natural selection is a conservative and inevitable consequence of this emergent novelty. This reversal of the orthodox position has, in our view, exciting consequences for cognitive science3.
The major consequence we explore in this paper is that this reformulation enables a conceptual bridging of the divide between traditional cognitive science, which seeks to discern the causal relations that determine the performance of a system, and the arenas of meaning and social action, which are not susceptible to causal explanations. Smedslund (1969: 8)4 has provided an economical description of the major difference between these two arenas, in that:

A crucial difference between a cause-effect relationship (A causes B) and an implication (A implies B) is that the former involves logically independent phenomena, which must be shown empirically to succeed each other, whereas the latter involves logically dependent phenomena. Physical phenomena may be linked by a theory from which it follows that A leads to B. On the other hand, a mental phenomenon A in itself implies B, without any theory (emphasis added).
Smedslund's formulation is prefigured in Mead's (1938) view of the relational nature of consciousness, and his development of a wider view of organism-environment relations: that 'the organism ... is in a sense responsible for its environment' (1934: p. 130). Mead provides here the basis for a temporal and interactive vocabulary to be developed, and one which can encompass mental as well as somatic phenomena. He makes the point that the environment, in this case 'grass-as-food', maps out the logical structure of the act of the 'ox-as-grass-eater': ' the structure of the environment is a mapping out of organic responses to nature: any environment, whether social or individual, is a mapping out of the logical structure of the act to which it answers, an act seeking overt expression (ibid: 129). At the same time, the 'reverse' view can be formulated or extrapolated: that the existence of the ox and its digestive system - its 'bacteriological laboratory' (ibid: 131) - has been mapped out from the logical structure implied by the existence of grass, along with the constraints provided by the starting point of the proto-ox's actual biology5.
The view we develop in this paper is that cognitive processes work to handle the implications of an organism's relationship with its environment. They provide organisms with an in-formed Umwelt6 in which appropriate actions can be essayed without necessarily requiring any representational support. This view builds on Plotkin's (1994: xiv)7 point that, somatically

adaptations are themselves knowledge, themselves forms of 'incorporation' of the world into the structure and organization of living things: ... the relationship of fit between parts of the organization of an organism, its limb structure, for instance, and some feature or features of the world in which it lives, such as terrain or medium through which it must move, is one in which that organization is in-formed by the environment.
We consider this stance with respect to cognition: that its functional organization provides an in-formed Umwelt to organisms, one in-formed of the implications of its relationship to its environment.
1 . e.g. Goodwin, B. (1994) How the leopard changed its spots: The evolution of complexity; Lewontin, R. (2000) The triple helix: Gene, organism, and environment.; Oyama, S. (1985) The ontogeny of information. (2002) Evolution's eye.

2 . Reid, R. (2007) Biological emergences: Evolution by natural experiment.
3 . We develop the position more fully in Lock, A. and Hill, S. (forthcoming) Out of our heads: The second cognitive revolution.

From Extended Mind to Embodied Agents

Vincent C. Muller
Anatolia College/ACT
Dept. of Humanities & Social Sciences
PO Box 21021, 55510 Pylaia, Greece
+30-2310-398 211
vmueller@act.edu
www.typos.de
Abstract:

The standard view is that self-contained agents pursue their own goals, sometime in cooperation with other agents, and sometimes using external tools. This typically, but not necessarily, goes together with a view of these agents as rational agents that perceive, then plan and finally act (and the view that robots should be built that way: with sensors, processor and effectors). Clark and Chalmers show a number of examples where it does not seem to matter whether the human cognitive activity takes places ‘in the head’ or outside: rotating blocks mentally or physically (to see whether they would fit a gap), touching something with hands or a stick, counting in the head vs. with fingers and, finally, Otto and Inga, who both know where the Museum of Modern Art is, but Otto has Alzheimer’s and ‘knows’ this because he has written it down in his notebook (Clark and Chalmers 1998). In each of these cases, they follow the ‘Parity Principle’, namely “… if a state plays the same causal role in the cognitive network as a mental state, then there is a presumption of mentality”, in Chalmers’ words (in Clark 2008: xv). Their thesis thus proceeds from extended perception, extended mental processes to extended belief, short the ‘extended mind’.

My view is that the discussion tends to show that the extended mind thesis is literally false, at least for beliefs and other conscious mental states (even Clark recently tends to admit as much), but has interesting consequences. Following the lead of (Sprevak 2009), I will argue that the extended mind discussion constitutes a ‘reductio ad absurdum’ of certain views of the mind (Sprevak argues it follows from functionalism), and thus supports a modest thesis of embodiment. If we consider the full picture of ‘cognition’, we can not restrict ourselves to what is ‘inside the skin’, we must allow for cooperation, even intelligence of complex wholes (like ‘swarms’), for cognitive offloading onto the environment and culture (e.g. Hutchins 2011), for construction of our own cognitive niche (Clark 2006; 2008: 61ff) and we must remember that much of the abilities of agents are due to the morphology of their bodies (Pfeifer and Bongard 2007). This does not mean, however, that we must conclude that ‘the mind is extended’ – because that becomes absurd – but that we must forget about describing the abilities of such agents and systems in terms of ‘minds’ and their location. Instead, we must admit that out perspectives and explanatory purposes determine where we want to make the ‘cut’ of what counts as ‘one agent’ – and then the best explanation wins, whether it involves only systems inside a skin or not.

Clark describes his own view as that “according to which thinking and cognizing may, at times, depend directly and noninstrumentally upon the ongoing work of the body and/or the extraorganismic environment.” (Clark 2008: xxviii). And the crucial endnote 4 reads “The term cognizing is here used to mark a notion of the mental that is broader than the one suggested by introspection and common sense alone. Where introspection and common sense might identify mind simply as a locus of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, and so forth, the scope of the cognitive may include states and operations unearthed by science.” – What I want to suggest is that we should stop granting special status to the ‘common sense’ notion of ‘mind’ and bade farewell to the grand philosophical tradition connected to the analysis of its agents as having special status. The mind is dead.
References
Clark, Andy (2003), Natural born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and the future of
human intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
—— (2006), ‘Language, embodiment, and the cognitive niche’, Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 10 (8), 370-74.
—— (2008), Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension (New
York: Oxford University Press).
Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David J. (1998), ‘The extended mind’, Analysis, 58 (1),
43-64.
Hutchins, Edwin (2011), ‘Enculturating the supersized mind’, Philosophical Studies,
152 (3), 437-46.
Pfeifer, Rolf and Bongard, Josh (2007), How the body shapes the way we think: A new
view of intelligence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).
Sprevak, Mark (2009), ‘Extended cognition and functionalism’, The Journal of
Philosophy, 106 (9), 503-27.

. e.g. Goodwin, B. (1994) How the leopard changed its spots: The evolution of complexity; Lewontin, R. (2000) The triple helix: Gene, organism, and environment.; Oyama, S. (1985) The ontogeny of information. (2002) Evolution's eye.

. Reid, R. (2007) Biological emergences: Evolution by natural experiment.

. We develop the position more fully in Lock, A. and Hill, S. (forthcoming) Out of our heads: The second cognitive revolution.

. Smedslund, J. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 10: 1-15

. Mead, G.H (1934) Mind, self and society.

. In the sense of von Uexkull (1957).

. Plotkin, H. (1994) Darwin machines and the nature of knowledge

Identification of source and target domains in a visual metaphor and the role of
perceptual similarity therein: An eye-movement study

Amitash Ojha (amitash.ojha@iiit.ac.in)
Bipin Indurkhya (bipin@iiit.ac.in)
Cognitive Science Lab
International Institute of Information Technology
Gachibowli, Hyderabad-32, INDIA

The origin of the view that metaphor plays a key role in cognition can be attributed to I.A. Richards (1936): “Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive there from.” However, much of the contemporary research on metaphor has remained focused on metaphors of language. More recently, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argued with numerous examples that “metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language.” Though this work spawned a whole new generation of metaphor researchers, the focus still remained largely on verbal manifestations of the underlying metaphoric thought. There have been only a few studies on non-linguistic modes of metaphor, and they have been mostly concerned with visual metaphors ( Blackwell, 1998; Forceville, 1996; Kennedy, 1982; Noel, 1994) Even then, there is no consensus on such basic questions as: What are the source and the target domains of a visual metaphor and how are they identified? How do the two domains interact to generate the metaphorical meaning? If features are mapped, then what features of the source domain are mapped onto the target domain? (Forceville 2002.) Our goal in this research is to shed some light on these issues using eye-movement studies. Here we report on the results of two experiments towards this goal.

The present study focuses on two kinds of visual metaphors. One is what is called homospatial metaphor by Carroll (1994) and contextual metaphor by Forceville (2007). Two examples of such metaphors are shown in Figure 1. In the first one, the head of the boy is replaced with a loudspeaker. The metaphor may be paraphrased, as “the boy’s mouth is a loudspeaker.” Here the target of the metaphor, the boy’s head is absent, and is strongly implied by the context. The source of the metaphor, the loudspeaker, is used to replace the head, so homospatiality triggers the interaction between the source and the target. (A verbal counterpart of such metaphors might be “the butcher operated on the patient”, where the words ‘operated’ and ‘patient’ suggest the concept of ‘surgeon’, which is the target of the metaphor.) One other characteristic necessary for visual metaphors that Carroll posited is incongruity, namely that the source, which is the object replacing the target, should be incongruous with the rest of the picture. Based on this, we hypothesize that the viewer must notice the incongruity (pay more attention to it) in order to come up with a metaphorical interpretation. It is this hypothesis that we empirically investigate in the first experiment.

The other kind of visual metaphor that we chose for this study is what Forceville (2006) calls pictorial simile. An example of this is shown in Figure 2, which can be paraphrased as “The sun is like an apple” (or “The apple is like sun”, for there is no implied directionality in the visual juxtaposition.) Here two images are juxtaposed and the viewer may or may not form a metaphorical mapping between them. Our hypothesis is that perceptual similarity, at the level of color, shape, texture, orientation, etc between Source and Target concept, plays a key role in forming a metaphorical interpretation (Indurkhya 2006, Sec. 8.3). However, the problem in testing this hypothesis is how to determine perceptual similarity without causing the participants to form metaphors inadvertently. To get out of this impasse, we decided to use a computer-based image-search system called FISH to establish perceptual similarity (Indurkhya, Kattalay, Ojha and Tandon 2008). In the second experiment we investigate the effect of perceptual similarity (as implemented in FISH system) on metaphorical interpretation. We use eye-movement study to check whether the participants are attending to the perceptually similar regions of the two images and how this correlates to their metaphorical interpretations.

Results of experiment suggest
1. Incongruity must be attended to for identifying the target of a pictorial metaphor, and for coming up with a metaphorical interpretation (figure 3).
2. As far as pictorial similes are concerned, attention must be focused on the perceptual similarities between the two images in order for a viewer to come up with a metaphorical interpretation. Moreover, the attention is shared between the perceptually similar regions of the two images in a symmetric way (Figure 4) suggesting that they are being compared during metaphorical interpretation.

Caroll, Noel, 1994, Visual Metaphor, In: Jaako Hintikka, ed, Apects of Metaphor, Dordecht, Kluwer
Forceville C, 2002 The identification of target and source in pictorial metaphors, Journal of pragmatics
Forceville C, 2007, Multimodal Metaphor in Ten Dutch TV Commercials, The Public Journal of
Semiotics
Indurkhya B, 2006, "Emergent representations, interaction theory, and the cognitive force of
metaphor," New Ideas in Psychology,
Keneddy, John M, 1982, Metaphor in pictures, Perception
Indurkhya, B., K. Kattalay, A. Ojha and P. Tandon (2008). Experiments with a creativity-support
system based on perceptual similarity. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference of Software
Methodologies, Tools andTechniques, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.
Schwering, A., K.-U. Kühnberger, U. Krumnack, H. Gust, B. Indurkhya, A. Ojha: A , 2009
computational model for visual metaphors - Interpreting creative visual advertisements. In International
Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence. Porto, Portugal: Springer
Tandon, P., Nigam, P., Pudi, V. and Jawahar, C.V. (2008). FISH: A Practical System for Fast
Interactive Image Search in Huge Databases Proceedings of 7th ACM International Conference on
Image and Video Retrieval (CIVR '08), July 7-9, 2008, Niagara Falls, Canada.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1980), Metaphors We Live By, Chicago/London: University of Chicago
Press.

Figure 3: Average Heat maps
(A and B shows focused attention when the
metaphor is comprehended, C and D shows a
distributed attention when the metaphor is not
comprehended.)

Figure 4: Average Heat maps in experiment 2
(1A: Average heat maps show focused
attention in perceptually similar regions if the
image is interpreted metaphorically)

Anticipatory network representations: Tetris, a case study

Jean-Charles Quinton
INRIA/LORIA
Professional address (until March 31):
615 rue du Jardin Botanique, 54600 Villers-lès-Nancy, France
Email: quintonj@loria.fr

Abstract:
This paper explores how representations can emerge from networks of local anticipations acquired through interaction with the environment. The nature and relationships between such representations are studied in the context of the Tetris game, where the various elements of the board are differentiated from the sensorimotor flow. Spatiotemporal regularities are learned by predicting the changes in the visual flow resulting from gaze shifts and keyboard actions. While general predictions about saccades across non-deformable objects most often apply and structure space, specific predictions about rotations of larger block sets help differentiating the various tetrominoes (i.e. game pieces).
We here commit to the interactive model proposed by Bickhard, where representations emerge from the processes of anticipation, from webs of indicated or anticipated potential future courses of interaction (Bickhard 1998). Representations are therefore not associated to any single state or particular prediction, although predictions constitute the only form of knowledge manipulated by the cognitive agent, thus also echoing the neuroscientific theory of network memory (Fuster 1997). On the contrary and in the model proposed in this paper, a large number of local anticipations simultaneously try to assimilate the agent/environment dynamics and normatively detect their adequacy by comparing the expected consequences of their proposed actions with the actual evolution of the system. We will here focus on the possibility to generate more or less specific anticipations that participate in intertwined networks – with overlaps and inclusions – associated with more or less specific representations. The same model has previously been used for non Tetris based sensorimotor applications, to demonstrate emergent capabilities and properties that will not be dealt with in this paper, such as optimal planning or robustness (Quinton and Inamura 2007, Quinton and Buisson 2008).

Satisfying the Tetris game objectives is an NP-hard optimization problem (Demaine et al. 2003) and approximation algorithms are therefore often used to reduce its complexity. Though the proposed model is meant to provide a full controller for the game (correctly positioning the pieces on the board so as to finish the maximal number of lines), we will only consider the differentiation and manipulation of tetrominoes in an interactive way. Compared to classical methods, the problem is transformed by only providing to the agent a local view of the board (3x3 blocks). The number of visual signals is thus reduced although the entire board can still be easily explored through gaze shifts. Whereas only 4 actions are generally considered (moving/rotating the piece to the left/right), 4 additional actions are here introduced (gaze shifts in the 4 directions). This drastically reduces the number of anticipations required to represent the pieces and board organization, as the objects need to be visible on the field for learning to occur. It however induces a shift from purely spatial to spatiotemporal pattern recognition. As shown on Fig.1, many situations indeed require actions to be differentiated, for instance when tetrominoes are close to a border or partially outside the field of view. tetromino

A Dynamic Neural Fields (DNF) Spatial Language Architecture: the Emergence of Spatial Language Behaviors.

Yulia Sandamirskaya
Institut fur Neuroinformatik
Ruhr-Universitat Bochum
44780 Bochum, Germany
E-mail: yulia.sandamirskaya@ini.rub.de

The theory of dynamic neural fields (DNF) is a modeling framework, in which cognitive processes are described as dynamics of activation functions defined over metrical spaces. The metrical spaces span different dimensions that characterize perceptual states of a cognitive agent or motor parameters of its actions that are relevant for a particular behavior. Peaks of positive activation over localized regions in these characteristic dimensions are dynamical representations of the perceptual and motor parameters in a particular state. Because of a sigmoid non-linearity that shapes the output of a neural field and the pattern of lateral interactions within the field, the states with positive activation are separated by a bifurcation from the quiescent states. Thus, a localized activity peak emerges in a 'detection' instability. Such a peak contains information about the presence of a certain characteristics in the particular state and an estimation of this characteristics. The peak solution is stabilized by the lateral interactions within the field against fluctuations in the input that induced the detection instability. If the input is multimodal, the field may also perform selection and stabilize the 'decision' for a particular mode of the input.

Several low-dimensional neural fields may be coupled and constitute a dynamical architecture. Coupling between the neural fields is effective only if positive activation is present in one of the coupled fields. This provides for an effective separation of the complex overall dynamics into functional neural fields modules. The neural fields may also be coupled continuously to a low-level sensory input, as well as to a dynamics that controls a motor system. A particular behavior is generated by a DNF architecture that is embodied and situated in a particular environment. The behavior depends on the environmental inputs, on the connectivity between the neural fields, on the parameters of lateral interaction within the field, on the working memory, and on the long-term memory traces left by the previous activation of the neural fields.

One of the examples of such a cognitive architecture within the DNF framework is a spatial language architecture I present here. The architecture includes a DNF color-space representation of the visual input, spatial representations of the target and the reference objects, a representation of the spatial-terms semantics coupled to a spatial neural field over space in an object-centered frame, as well as a neural-dynamic mechanism for reference frames transformation. This architecture is implemented to guide a robotic behavior based on visual input from a robotic camera and on language (keywords) input from a human user. The robot is able to answer \What?" and \Where?" questions about a visual scene and to use spatial language terms to drive its attention to a particular object or to guide its action. When the user asks a particular question, s/he can specify color of the target and the reference object, inquiring the spatial relation between them. Alternatively, s/he can specify the color of the reference object and a spatial term, inquiring the color of the target object. When only the color of the target object is specified, the system produces the colors of both the target and the reference objects as an answer. The flow of activation in the spatial language architecture is defined by the inputs that the user provides and their timing, by the graded spatial and feature properties of a particular scene perceived by the robot, and by the history of the human-robot interaction. The behavior of the robot { a particular answer or a movement towards the target object { results from this activation flow.

The dynamics of the architecture models the process of generation of spatial language behaviors. Both the time-courses of the decisions within the architecture and the statistics of their outcome may be related to human experimental data. The robotic experiments demonstrate how spatial language behaviors may emerge in a real-world setting when external inputs shape the dynamics of a DNF architecture and how spatial language may be flexibly and fluently integrated in thedynamics of cognitive processing of a visual scene.

Pythagorean Naturalism

Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, and Institute for Cognitive Science
University of Pennsylvania
423 Claudia Cohen Hall
249 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6304

Physicalist positions dominate contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. In a recent series of papers I have been rethinking several key positions on the mind-body problem. Herein, I rethink physicalism. Two points of departure: (i), today, I’ll assume that the physicalist is correct that mental entities are not ontologically fundamental. (ii), Fundamental physics is highly mathematical (e.g., consider string theory and quantum mechanics). I argue that we cannot understand physical properties or particulars without understanding the nature of mathematical entities – plausibly, physical entities are individuated by mathematical ones and are part of their natures. I then argue that an advocate of a physicalist solution to the mind -body problem must reject nominalisms in mathematics because, surprisingly, the currently viable forms undermine a physicalist solution to the mind-body problem. If we want to take the mathematical nature of physics seriously, I suspect we’ll need to be Platonists. This marriage of physicalism and Platonism may strike many as not being a form of physicalism at all: fair enough. I’ll call it “Pythagorean Naturalism” then; let’s see whether it is tenable.

Making it Mental: In Search of the Golden mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy

Do cognitive processes extend beyond the brain proper, covering portions of the body and even the environment of an intelligent agent? The traditional wisdom within the cognitive sciences has always held that mental processes are intracranial, namely, that they supervene on neural processes located inside one’s head (see, e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2008 chap. 1, Block 2005, Prinz 2006). Yet, this orthodoxy is challenged by a seemingly growing support for the idea that cognition is literally constituted, in part, by items and processes located in the body proper, or even in the external environments of cognitive agents. While some authors on this side of the fence emphasize the corporeal nature of cognition (Noë 2004) whereas others stress extracorporeal factors (Clark and Chalmers 1998, Gibbs 2001, Wilson 2004) there seems to be a consensus among those who advance the extended cognition hypothesis (ECH) that cognition is jointly constituted by brain, body, and world (see for example, Chemero 2009, Clark 2008, van Gelder 1995).
     Much of the controversy surrounding ECH has to do with the radical claim that extracranial and even extracorporeal variables are literally constitutive of, as opposed to being merely causally relevant for, cognitive processing. For supporters, this radical import is a source of excitement but critics of extended cognition warn that the revolution is costly and ill-fated. Above all, they complain that the constitution claim involves a fallacy, which Adams and Aizawa, two of the most persistent and meticulous critics of ECH, call the coupling-constitution fallacy (Adams and Aizawa 2001, 2008a; see also Block 2005, Prinz 2006). The allegation is that proponents of ECH illicitly move from the observation that cognitive processes causally depend on, or are coupled to variables located at the agent’s body, or in the environment, to the conclusion that the mind literally extends into those extracranial and extracorporeal factors. The evidence, the critics argue, do not support the constitution hypothesis.
     Adams and Aizawa, in particular, also argue that the proponents of extended cognition neglect to pay sufficient attention to the marks of the cognitive, that is, to those unique features which qualify a process as cognitive. Such marks, they believe, ought to play the role of adequacy criteria for philosophical accounts of cognition, which is to say that they must be satisfied by any account worth having. One mark of the cognitive singled out by Adams and Aizawa is intrinsic content. Cognitive processes, they maintain, are loci of representational content, and the content they exemplify is intrinsic rather than derived (cf. Searle 1992). A major problem with theories of the extended mind, charge Adams and Aizawa, is that they fail to respect this condition, making mind extend over variables which could not possibly be repositories of intrinsic content.
     At the present, the debate seems to be reaching its zenith, giving rise to a score of publications and conferences, and to ever more articulated arguments and counterarguments (see, for example, the papers in Menary 2010, and in Robbins and Aydede 2008). But could it be that the whole debate is in some sense somewhat misguided? Could it be that the call to choose sides reflects an exaggerated dichotomy? I shall argue that, in an important sense, it is. My own view is that each side is significantly right but also significantly wrong and that we had better move on towards a view which transcends both positions while retaining some of their basic assumptions, or, at any rate, sentiments.
     Essentially, I present an alternative account of the boundaries of the mind which sides with the “radicals” on the constitution issue but is allied with the “conservatives” in insisting on the privileged status of intracranial processes within our mental economy. On this view, although cognitive processes are indeed extended their very core consists of intentional and phenomenal subprocesses located inside the cranium. As I show, this alternative outlook is rooted, in large part, in an idea which originates with two of the rightful forefathers of the embodied and situated approach to the mind – John Dewey and Jakob von Uexküll. Both Dewey and Uexküll analyzed the process of cognition in terms of the notion of a functional cycle wherein sensory inputs and motor outputs continuously modulate each other in a coordinated, mutually regulating fashion, which also give rise to, and contains as a phase or subprocess, a neural interface characterized by intentional and phenomenal properties.
     Clearly, this idea of the functional cycle, as developed by Dewey and by Uexküll, is a precursor of cybernetic and system-theoretic accounts of cognition, including of theories which were directly influential in the development of interactivism (e.g., Gibson’s and Piaget’s). Indeed, I think it is fair to say that, in an important sense, the interactivist view of perception and cognition is itself predicated on this idea (although, of course, it amounts to much more, and although we have learned considerably more about different types of work cycles and regulatory loops, or about self-organization, neural organization, control hierarchies, and so on).
     If cognitive processes are generically of this cyclical-interactive type, what are the implications for the current extended cognition debate? One implication is that mental processes are indeed extended beyond the cranium. For example, on this view postural adjustments, limb movements, head movements, eye movements, and so on, in short all the coordinated motor ensembles which are integral to perceptual exploration, are constitutive of the very process of perception. Perception, as an adaptive epistemic process, is essentially constituted, in part, of such motor sequences since these sequences are an integral and indispensable part of the ongoing interactively-cyclical dynamics which yields perceptual knowledge.
     But while there is no doubt that, from this perspective, cognitive processes extend beyond the brain proper I believe that it is equally important not to loose sight of the fact that at the very core of the processes which are generically labeled as ‘cognitive’ lie conscious, and unconscious, mentations. Such mentations are noetic – they involve intrinsic intentional content and, when conscious, exemplify manifest experiential qualities – and, for all we know, they are intracranially located. To say that mentations form the very core of the processes we call ‘cognitive’ is a judgment which implies that, in an important sense, they occupy a privileged position within the totality of such processes. There are several good reasons to affirm this judgment. Thus, to begin, the most distinguished marks of the mental such as intrinsic content, qualitative feel, understanding, insight, problem solving capacities, etc. all (in their clearest forms, at any rate) betray of mentations. Relatedly, it is in virtue of exemplifying mentations that we are inclined to classify a process as cognitive in the first place. A coordinated behavior may be a sign of cognition but if we were to conclude that no mentations are involved we would also be inclined to conclude that nothing cognitive is being signified after all. Finally, from a dynamical angle, it is also clear that the mentation phase of a cognitive process enjoys a privileged status within the functional cycle in toto: It is courtesy of this phase that value (viz. meaning) is assigned, and reassigned, to the situation, modifying the activity set as a whole in a context-sensitive manner appropriate for the circumstances. In short, cognition is, first and foremost, the province of meaning, and meaning is the province of mentations. For this reason I propose that we think of mentations as forming the nucleus of a cognitive process, while reserving the terms embodiment envelope and embedding envelope, respectively, to somatic variables and environmental variables constitutive of the process in its entirety.
     It is now time to address another implication for the extended cognition debate. One of the major problems with the extended cognition hypothesis, as advanced, for example, by Clark and Chalmers (1998), lies in the fact that it blurs the boundaries between nucleus and envelope. Particularly troubling is the tendency to treat variables which belong, at best, with the envelope of a cognitive process as if they are on par with variables which belong with the nucleus. Thus, fore example, it is argued that if a subject is coupled to a notebook or a data bank such that these items are readily available for exploitation in a time of need then such environmental props are analogous to beliefs and memories. Beliefs and memories, however, belong with the nucleus of cognition and, as such, are intrinsically endowed with noetic qualities whereas the aforementioned props belong, at best, with the embedding envelope and are clearly devoid of such qualities. To this extent, I believe that critics such as Adams and Aizawa (e.g., 2008) are correct when they complain that something has gone wrong. What has gone wrong, however, lies not with the assumption that cognition is extended per se, but rather in assigning extracranial variables a status which can only be had by, hence must be exclusively preserved for, intracranial mentations. As a result, sight is lost of the uniqueness of intracranial processes within the totality of cognitive organization. More generally, it is vital not to loose sight of the significance of distinguishing clearly between the respective contributions of intracranial, intracorporeal and environmental variables – however closely coupled – to the making of the mind.

Needless to say, both authors also stressed that this cyclical dynamics takes place in active organisms adaptively engaged with their surroundings. The internal aspects of the cycle are emphasized more by Uexküll but are by no means denied by Dewey either.

I take it for granted here that the same moral applies to other cognitive processes, albeit perhaps less conspicuously so. At any rate, if the analysis is correct this example is sufficient for establishing the constitution hypothesis (although, strictly speaking, it establishes the claim that cognitive processes extend beyond the cranium without necessarily implying that they are also extended beyond the body and into the environment).

Computational Models of Creativity: Taking Development Seriously

In this position paper, I start with the assumption that the creative process relies on and is a continuation of our regular cognitive development process through which humans go starting from birth onwards. Although, to some, this may look like a safe and obvious assumption, it is not until early 2000 that attempts to relate research in developmental psychology and in creativity were made (e.g. Sawyer et al. 2003). Creative leaps happen all the time as children learn to master walking and language, acquire social norms, and develop particular skills and expertise through education. Most of these creative acts would fall under the P-creative (or Psychological creativity) label proposed by Margaret Boden (1990). P-creativity thus refers to ideas/objects/skills that are produced by an individual and that are new to that particular person. In contrast, H-creativity refers to the production of ideas/objects/skills that have never before occurred in all human history. In many different contexts, attempts to define what creativity is, implicitly refer to H-creativity. A fairly common definition is that something is creative if it is novel and valuable. It is evident thus that whether something is creative (i.e. novel and valuable) will depend on the audience and the larger social context. Much of the research in computational modeling of creativity so far, aimed on designing programs that produce artifacts which would be perceived as creative by a wide audience (i.e. H-creativity). Examples include programs that write stories, paint, compose, discover new physical laws, or prove a mathematical theorem (for a recent review see Boden, 2009). The assumption (if only implicit) is that we can isolate and build a “creativity module” for a specific domain. Admittedly, some of the programs created via this top down approach can be used as tools that help human’s creative process (e.g. using a program that helps a writer to generate scripts for new episodes of an ongoing TV serial). But, as I will argue in this paper, they do not offer a satisfying model of human creativity. The first objection is that creativity cannot be isolated from the rest of the cognitive processes: from perception, curiosity and motivation to analogical and metaphorical thinking, to mention but a few. Second, creative processes are essentially an extension of the cognitive development. A critique aimed at a particular subclass of the top down creativity models (scientific discovery) is given in (Stojanov, 2009). I will then present the result of an analysis of three cognitive architectures: ACT-R (Anderson, 1993), LIDA (Franklin et al. 2007), and Novamente AGI (Goertzel and Pennachin, 2007) with respect to the possibility to model creativity. In these architectures creativity would emerge naturally as interplay of many related cognitive processes instead of a separate creativity module. Finally, my conclusion is that the best starting point for modeling creativity are cognitive architectures developed within developmental artificial intelligence (and developmental robotics) and will illustrate this with examples from the architecture that my team has been developing over the last decade or so (Stojanov, 2001; Kulakov and Stojanov, 2002; Stojanov and Kulakov, 2006). I believe that this re-framing of the problem blurs somewhat the distinction between P and H-creativity, aims lower with respect to the creative output, but, on a long run, will increase our understanding of the human creative process.
References
Anderson, J. R. 1993. Rules of the Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
Boden, M. 1990. The creative mind. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Boden, M. 2009. “Computer Models of Creativity”, AAAI AI Magazine, Vol. 30. No. 3, pp 23-33.
Franklin, S., Ramamurthy, U., D'Mello, S., McCauley, L., Negatu, A., Silva R., & Datla, V. 2007. LIDA: A computational model of global workspace theory and developmental learning. In AAAI Fall Symposium on AI and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. Arlington, VA: AAAI
Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. 2007. “The Novamente Artificial Intelligence Engine”. In Goertzel, B. and Pennachin, C. (Eds.) Artificial General Intelligence, Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Kulakov, A. and Stojanov, G., 2002. “Structures, inner values, hierarchies and stages: Essentials for developmental robot architectures”, In Proceedings of the 2nd International workshop on Epigenetic Robotics – Lund University Cognitive Studies 94, pp. 63-69
Sawyer, R.K., John-Steiner, V., Moran, S., Sternberg, R.J., Feldman, D.H., Nakamura, J., and Csikszentmihalyi, M. 2003. Creativity and Development. Oxford University Press.
Stojanov, G. 2009. “Artificial Scientists: Why Are we Not There Yet”, Interactivism Summer Institute 2009, Vancouver, June 2009.
Stojanov G., Kulakov A., 2006. “On Curiosity in Intelligent Robotic Systems”, in Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposia, Arlington, VA, USA.
Stojanov, G., 2001. “Petitagé: A case study in developmental robotics”, Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Epigenetic Robotics, Lund University Cognitive Studies, 85.

History of Usage of Piaget’s Theory of Cognitive Development in AI and Robotics: a Look Backwards for a Step Forwards

It appears that the topic of cognitive development went mainstream in AI and robotics in the last 10 years or so1. As a result, Jean Piaget’s ideas on child cognitive development and his genetic epistemology are receiving an unprecedented interest.

On the other hand a brief historic research clearly shows that his ideas have been introduced and re-introduced to the AI community on several occasions and almost always independently during the last 40 years.
In this paper I report some preliminary results of an ongoing research project the aim of which is to identify and critically compare the approaches to computational modeling of cognitive development directly inspired by Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology. Some of these results presented here were presented during the two symposia that I have organized within the annual Jean Piaget Society meetings 2004 and 2009.
Seymour Papert, (Papert, 1963), Margaret Boden’s (Boden, 1978) and Jarret Rosenberg (Rosenberg, 1980) all pointed to the potential mutual benefit that AI and Piagetian theory can get from each other: AI (with its methodologies) can complement Piaget’s theory which often relies on notions that lack specific details. In return AI can get advantage from Piaget’s big picture framework of cognitive development.
The rest of the poster is organized in the following way. For approximately every decade (‘70s through 2009) I present a sample or two of relevant research works with a short comment. In the second part I point to some of the commonalities among them and draw attention to areas where there has been little progress.

One of the first attempts to build programs that simulate infant behavior in variety of Piagetian tasks (like class inclusion and conservation of quantity) is the work of Klahr and Wallace (Klahr and Wallace, 1972, 1973, 1976). Along similar lines Baylor et al (1973) and Young (1976) developed simulations for the seriation task where children are asked to order a set of objects along certain attribute (e.g. length or weight). All these models used production rule systems (i.e. a list of Condition-Action pairs) to model infant behavior at different stages of development and at different granularity. Low level perception processes were not modeled, and the programs were given high level description of the problem space (e.g. the position and attributes like color and length of the blocks in the seriation task simulator by Young). The creative work was to find and order the set of rules (e.g. If you see the biggest block THEN put it first in the series) which, starting from some initial configuration, will come (or not) to the goal configuration, exhibiting behavior similar to the children of particular stage. Later on, Klahr and Wallace attempted to model the development or transition from one stage to another using a variant of self modifying production rule systems (as reported in Neches et al (1987).
What is curious for these early works is the virtual absence of reference to the notions scheme, adaptation, and assimilation, all central to Piaget’s theory. Much in the spirit of the then dominant information processing paradigm (within the cognitive turn in psychology), some of the preferred terms were knowledge structures, information processing, discrimination, generalization, and the like.

This changed during the ‘80s when Gary Drescher (Drescher, 1985, 1987, 1991) undertook probably the most ambitious attempt to give a computational model for the schema learning mechanism, and used this mechanism in a simulated agent which would learn a useful representation of its environment with virtually no innate knowledge. Dresher’s simulation included a discrete 2D microworld, baby’s body, her visual field (foveal and peripheral), one hand, objects, and a set of innate primitive actions (like grasp, move-hand-backwards) and primitive perceptual items (like hand-at-1-1, hand-closed, hand-grasping-something). Schemas were represented as triplets (context/action/consequence) where context and consequence can be conjunctions or disjunctions of (possibly negated) items. Initially, there are only schemas with empty context and consequence parts. Drescher presents a statistical technique called marginal attribution which (starting from random actions) successfully learn reliable schemas that for given context can predict the consequences of the actions in the microworld. Another significant innovation were the synthetic items. They introduce composite actions which subsume several primitive (or synthetic) items. There are two modes of functioning: exploratory mode (when schemas are executed in a quasi random manner) and goal directed mode where specific perceptual items are marked as goal states and the system should come up with a sequence of schemas that will bring it to the goal items.

Quite independently a research group in Geneva called CEPIAG (for Cybernétique Epistémologie Psychologie Intelligence Artificielle Génétiques) has produced a considerable body of research during the early 1990’s and it included members that have worked with Piaget (like Guy Céllerier and Jean-Jacques Ducret). To my knowledge, they presented the first physical implementation of a constructivist agent. Another peculiarity is that they provided a minimal social context for the developing agent by including a second mother robot. Their research aim was “to model the pre-representational developmental stages which are necessary to prepare the infant for the representational behaviors which appear about month 16 to 18.” (Schachner, personal communication). Unfortunately, their work has largely remained unpublished save some internal publications and non English language local conferences (Schachner, 1996; Schachner et al., 1999; Ducret et al., 1999). The robot could move around on two wheels and had needs to be satisfied (like being hungry or sleepy). The schema in their implementation comprised three parts: sensorium, motivarium, and motorium. Depending what robot’s current needs were (motivarium) it would try to sense (assimilate) the current situation (sensorium) and (in case of successful assimilation) would apply the appropriate actions (motorium). Learning consisted of (among other things) in getting the right ordering of execution of schemas in order for a need to be satisfied. New schemas could be produced by the existing ones by: a) differentiation (e.g. original schema with only motorium specified (e.g. go_forward) gets closer to a light source or makes the robot touch an object in front of it) when motivarium and the sensorium part will be specified depending on the consequence of the execution of the motorium part, b) assimilation of two existing schemas (e.g. one schema has the action turning-left in the motorium part and another turning-right) when merged they will produce a new schema which will move the robot forward; and c) by introduction of meta-schemas where the motivarium and sensorium part will be specified (e.g. the robot is hungry and want to go to a state where it is not hungry) and the learning mechanism will have to find one or several existing schemas that would move the system from the actual state (hungry) to the desired one (not hungry).

The focus of my group was to come up of a mechanism where a simulated agent in a 2D maze-like environment would autonomously learn a useful representation of environment out of its interactions with the environment (Stojanov et al., 1996; Stojanov, 2001; Stojanov et al., 2006). The agent was able to perform 4 elementary actions (moving forward, backward, left, and right) and had only a touch sensor. Initially the agent had only one schema comprised of random sequence of the elementary actions (e.g. FFRFFFLFFFRBFFFF). The agent would try to perform the whole sequence but environmental constraints would make it impossible at certain point (e.g. going F when in front of an obstacle). In that case the agent would skip the impossible action(s) and continue with the next possible one. The actually executed subsequence (the enabled subschema) would then be memorized, together with the link to the previous enabled subschema. We called this process accommodation and the result of it was a repertoire of enabled subschemas, with their contingency links. The environment would be completely assimilated if at every moment (after having executed a particular enabled subschema) the agent could find a sequence of enabled subschemas that would bring it to a desired place in the environment.
After 2000 there were dozens of researchers that proposed their own version of Piagetian inspired constructivist agents. I can mention Filipo Perotto (Perotto et al., 2007) and Frank Guerin’s work (Guerin & McKenzie, 2008) who have suggested computational mechanism for schema based learning, including assimilation and accommodation mechanisms. Both of them worked with simulated agents and used a variant of Drescher’s schema construct. Jean-Christophe Buisson (Buisson, 2004) suggested a computational model of the schema mechanism applied to the problem of learning to predict the next stroke of a rhythm tapped on the keyboard. The program uses a genetic algorithm to generate new schemas if the current one does not predict well enough the rhythm and thus with time new schemas are produced that assimilate the rhythm perfectly.

Let me draw some tentative conclusions on the basis of the above presented research samples. First of all, we can observe a trend where computational models moved from modeling infant’s behavior during some rather high level tasks towards trying to simulate earliest periods (beginnings of the sensory motor stage) of the cognitive development. Modeling performance of linguistically competent subjects on some particular task may not be very informative (at least for the goals of AI or robotics) given that it is unrealistic that we can capture all the intricacies at that stage that may influence the performance.

Second, it seems that several researchers starting from quite abstract and somewhat loosely defined Piagetian notions like the schema mechanism, equilibration, accommodation/assimilation and the like, independently came up with rather similar computational mechanisms. For example, most of the above computational models of a schema use a variant of a data structure of the form (S1-A-S2) where S1 is the sensory input before action A is applied and S2 is the resulting consequence. They can be all regarded as action based, future oriented representations of the agent’s world (cf. Bickhard, 2005). Other researchers, starting from fairly different assumptions arrived to similar conclusions regarding these properties of mental representations (e.g. Pezullo, 2008; Grush, 2004).

Third, most of them stressed the importance of open-ended learning and hence the importance of modeling the inner value system and phenomena like curiosity or epistemic hunger.

Fourth, in all of the above systems, the process of development seems to be driven predominantly by the environmental input, leaning thus towards the empiricist end of the nativism-empiricism epistemological specter. The knowledge structures that arise in this way are unavoidably a deterministic outcome of the agent-environment interaction. This precludes any creative process where, say, by analogy, an agent would extend its knowledge from one domain to another. We have discussed some of these issues in (Stojanov et al. 2006; Kulakov&Stojanov, forthcoming). In Piagetian parlance this would mean that most of the above presented models account primarily for the empirical abstraction and neglect the reflective abstraction which is crucial for development and creativity. Briefly, by empirical abstraction some quality (e.g. weight or color) is abstracted from an object. On the other hand, reflective abstraction is about reorganization of existing schemas and their projection on a higher plane. (see Kitchener, 1983, pp. 61-65, for informative discussion of empirical and reflective abstraction as well as Campbell&Bickhard, 1993 discussion on the knowing levels). So far, only limited schema manipulation mechanisms seem to be proposed (Drescher’s synthetic items, CEPIAG’s meta-schemas, or Buisson genetic algorithm).

Finally none of the (so far) reviewed models tried to tackle the effects of maturation and biological growth on the cognitive development.

1 As witnessed by the emergence of several conferences like Epigenetic Robotics, the International Conference on Development and Learning, as well as several workshops on Developmental Robotics within AAAI symposia. Most of them were initiated at the turn of the new millennium.

References
Baylor, G. W., Gascon, J., Lemoyne, G, and Pother, N, N. (1973). An Information Processing Model of Some Seriation Tasks, Canadian Psychologist 14:167-196.
Bickhard, M. H. (2005). Anticipation and Representation. In C. Castelfranchi (Ed.) From Reactive to Anticipatory Cognitive Embodied Systems. (1-7). AAAI Fall Symposium, Technical Report FS-05-05. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press.
Boden, M. A. (1978). Artificial Intelligence and Piagetian Theory. Synthese 38:389-414.
Boden, M. A., (2006) Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science, 2 vols., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, R. L., Bickhard, M. H. (1993). Knowing Levels and the Child's Understanding of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16(1), 33-34.
Drescher, G. L., (1985) The Schema Mechanism, A Conception of Constructivist Intelligence, M.S. thesis, MIT.
Drescher, G, L., (1987). A Mechanism for Early Piagetian Learning. Proceedings of the Sixth NationalConference on Artificial Intelligence. AAAI-1987.
Drescher, G. L. (1991). Made-Up Minds, A Constructivist Approach to Artificial Intelligence. MIT Press.
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Emotions and their Functional Role in Aesthetic Judgment

1Department of Product & Systems Design Engineering, University of the Aegean, Syros, Greece
2Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country, Avenida de Tolosa 70, 20080, San Sebastian, Spain

*Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ixen@aegean.gr (I. Xenakis), arar@aegean.gr (A. Arnellos), idarz@aegean.gr (J. Darzentas).

Abstract
As an autonomous agent attempts to increase his autonomy, he always tries to advance the complexity of the functions he uses in order to be able to serve his final decisions. In autonomous agents with a greater complexity that the basic one, emotional activity functions as a feedback system or a monitor mechanism that serves the regulation of the effectiveness of a potential or chosen interaction.
For most theorists emotions are highly related to the behavior as they are bound with agent’s goals and biological needs. Generally, emotions with a positive value (euphoric) are associated with the attainment of a goal, leading to decisions that allow an agent to continue with its current plan. In contrast, emotions with negative values (dysphoric) emerge when the agent has problems with the ongoing plans and fails to achieve the desired goals. Those values lead to problem-solving mechanisms reconsidering the existing goal structures in order to reconstruct new plans.
Many aesthetic theorists have proposed that there are basic emotional states such as pleasure or pain, which are connected, some of them a priori, with beauty or ugliness. William James was the first to distinguish between a primary and a secondary layer of emotional response to aesthetic stimuli. The primary layer consists of subtle feelings, by which, pleasure is elicited through harmonious combinations of sensational experiences (e.g. lines, colors, and sounds). The secondary pleasure offers the elegance in aesthetic taste. Other authors add to pleasure and pain a value character, which is associated with our preferences, including aesthetic ones, to provide an explanation to what we like or dislike, while others put the aesthetic emotions in the top of emotional pyramid. Frijda offers also a definition of affect, which is referred to hedonic experience as an experience of pleasure or pain.
Exploring emotions, their evolutionary origin and their basic neurobiological substratum, our aim in this paper is to detect the way in which emotions responsible for an aesthetic response (pleasure and pain) are emerged and how they eventually affect the formation of aesthetic decision. As such, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions that are also related to minimal aesthetic decisions that probably constitute the formation of aesthetic judgment. Particularly, we propose a naturalized explanation mostly based on Bickhard’s interactivist model of emergent representation, in order to detect the way in which emotions responsible for an aesthetic response are emerged and how they eventually affect the formation of aesthetic judgment. According to the interactive model of representation, emotions are implicitly associated to representations and in general, to the transformation of the factual knowledge in complex autonomous agents.
Taking into account also Damasio’s neurological evidences about mental images, emotional activity and their relations to what the agent likes or not, we argue that aesthetic meaning is based on dynamic changes, which occurred in the agent’s inner structure when he interacts with the physical structure of an object. Emotions are an outcome of a signal mechanism, which detects those differentiations of the environmental conditions and warn the agent for possible failures of those conditions. The signaling devices located in agent’s structure, aid the construction of neural patterns resulting in possible emotional values.
As such, we strongly believe that the formation of aesthetic meaning could also be ascribed not only in the purely conscious part of the respective interactive process, but also in the respective emotional mechanism.
Particularly, in the suggested model, aesthetic emotions are considered as functions that serve an evaluation mechanism, as the agent tries to resolve the interactive uncertainty in a given interaction. Consequently, we consider the aesthetic emotional states of pleasure and pain as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty emerged in the specific interaction. Overall, this process serves the maintenance of the autonomy and the stability of the agent, since it functions as a detecting mechanism that could prevent the interactive error.
The proposed model of such a signal/evaluation mechanism, which leads to emotional aesthetic values, is structured upon the evidence of the appraisal theory of emotions, as it has been introduced by Lazarous and Frijda. Appraisal theory is also used as a vehicle for the detection of specific functions by which the evaluation mechanism is related to the elicitation of the aesthetic emotional meaning.
The ideally ultimate aesthetic verdict is a much more complex process than the one described and analyzed in the suggested minimal model. According to this model, the aesthetic judgment has to resolve also qualitative aspects of the emergent aesthetic emotions, which in turn construct more complex appraisal structures. Consequently, aesthetic emotions are more than what we use to name as pleasurable or painful; they have qualitative differentiations (e.g. intensity), which are causally dependent on the dynamic character of appraisal.
The whole approach to explore the functional significance of aesthetic emotions, which affect the complex aesthetic judgment is developed apart from non-naturalized explanations and abstract philosophical terms like beauty, sublime, aesthetic sensitivity, etc. that aesthetic philosophy has proposed so far as notions with a central role in aesthetic experience.
In contrast, according to the proposed model we suggest that:

Consequently, we consider the aesthetic emotional values of pleasure and pain as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty emerged in the specific interaction. Those aesthetic indications partly form, in a fundamental level, the elicitation of the aesthetic experience.

Raymond Martin & John Barressi, Naturalization of the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge, 2000).
Brian Cooney, Posthumanity: Thinking Philosophically about the Future (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 74.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
See for details, see Klaus Fuchs-Kittowski, “Reflections on the Essence of Information” in C. Foyd, H. Züllighoven, R. Budde, R. Keil-Slawik, Software Development and Reality Construction (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1991), 418.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 419.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 421.
Ibid., p. 418.
Ibid.
Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (New York: Longmans, 1957), p. p. xxviii-xxix.
Wiener, Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics or Control and Communication in The Animal and The Machine 2nd ed. (New York: The MIT Press, 1961), p. 11.
Fuchs-Kittowski, p. 418.
James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 103.
Ibid., p. 39
Ibid.
Fuchs-Kittowski, p. 417.
Ibid., p. 418.
Beninger, p. 103.
Ibid
Ibid.
Fuchs-Kittowski, p. 419. Emphasis in the original.
Ibid.
Cooney., p. 76. Emphasis in the original.

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